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Summary 
Title: The Determinants of Capital Structure: A Comparison of Listed Large Capitalization 
Non-Financial Companies in the U.S.A. and Sweden 
Course: BUSN89 - Degree Project in Corporate and Financial Management. 
Authors: Shirley Chen Ye Ekström & Indre Kanaporyte 
Supervisor: Naciye Sekerci 
Purpose: The aim of this study is to examine the determinants of capital structure via a cross-
country comparison between the U.S.A. and Sweden. With the consideration of firm specific 
factors, the main focus is on researching country effect and macroeconomic impacts on firms’ 
financing policy. 
Methodology: Quantitative and explanatory approach and deductive reasoning are applied in 
this research. Panel data with period fixed effects is used to run regressions, where dependent 
variable is leverage, which involves three different measures (i.e. total debt to total assets, 
long-term debt to total assets and short-term debt to total assets) and independent variables 
include firm-specific factors (i.e. tangibility, firm size, profitability, dividend payout, growth 
opportunities and non-debt tax shield), macroeconomic factors (i.e. GDP growth, inflation, 
interest rate, exchange rate, supply of bank funding and demand of bank loan), dummy 
variable for indicating countries (Sweden = 0; The U.S.A. = 1) and dummy variables for 
industries. 
Theoretical perspective: The theoretical review is based on the M&M Capital Structure 
Irrelevance Proposition, Trade-off theory, Free Cash Flow theory, Pecking Order theory and 
Legal Origin theory. Country characteristics of both Sweden and the U.S.A. are presented, as 
well. 
Empirical foundation: The research is based on 45 non-financial Large Cap firms listed on 
OMX Stockholm in Sweden and 167 non-financial Large Cap firms listed in NYSE in the 
U.S.A. The analysis covers the annual observations over the 10-year period from 2004 to 
2013. 
Conclusion: The empirical evidences of this research prove that 1) significant difference 
exists in the determinants of three leverage measures (total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and 
short-term debt ratio); 2) country effect does exist when firms in different countries decide 
financing policy; 3) industry has stronger explanatory power on leverage compared to the 
macroeconomic factors; while considering all the significant variables (at 5% significance 
level) in the regressions, industry effect is revealed to be more influential on capital structure; 
4) Trade-off theory and Free Cash Flow theory provide more explanation than Pecking Order 
theory.  
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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to examine the determinants of capital structure via a cross-country 
comparison between the U.S.A. and Sweden. With the consideration of firm specific factors, 
the main focus is on researching country effect and macroeconomic impacts on firms’ 
financing policy. Including both country and macroeconomic factors in the research allows 
for having a new approach on the topic. The research is based on 45 non-financial Large Cap 
firms listed on OMX Stockholm in Sweden and 167 non-financial Large Cap firms listed in 
NYSE in the U.S.A. The analysis covers the annual observations over the 10-year period from 
2004 to 2013. The empirical evidences of this research prove that there are significant 
differences in the determinants of three leverage measures (total debt ratio, long-term debt 
ratio and short-term debt ratio). Furthermore, the study reveals that country effect does exist 
when firms in different countries decide financing policy. The research also indicates that 
industry presents stronger explanatory power on leverage compared to the macroeconomic 
factors; while considering all the significant variables (at 5% significance level) in the 
regressions, industry effect is revealed to be more influential on capital structure. Last but not 
least, the study shows that Trade-off theory and Free Cash Flow theory provide more 
explanation than Pecking Order theory. 
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1 Introduction  
A brief background related to capital structure is firstly presented in this section. Then the 
problems and research gaps involving existing empirical studies on capital structure are 
discussed, which leads to the purpose of this study and the specific research questions. In the 
end, an overview of limitations and the outline of the paper are presented, as well. 
1.1 Background 
The capital structure decision, i.e. the choice between debt and equity, has long been a hot 
topic for finance literature. Since Modigliani and Miller first published their capital structure 
irrelevance proposition in 1958, extensive research in finance literature have been done for 
finding out what determines a firm’s capital structure. However, there is no consensus on this 
topic and there are still debates about firms’ capital structure decision. 
Researchers take various perspectives for studies involving capital structure. Majority of 
research works are focusing on the impact of firm specific determinants on capital structure 
decision. Some researchers exert their efforts on providing various modeling for optimal 
capital structure, such as the financial structure industry equilibrium model by Mackay and 
Philips (2002); while some other studies reveal that firms adjust their capital structure over 
time based on various firm specific and macroeconomic situations, and thus the capital 
structure choice often presents a certain pattern. This is exemplified by Korajczyk and Levy 
(2002) in their research work: “aggregate equity issues vary pro-cyclically and aggregate debt 
issues vary counter-cyclically for firms that access public financial markets” (p.3). 
Additionally, they claimed that firms with high level of financial constraints do not present an 
obvious counter-cyclical pattern on issuing debt; but both macroeconomic conditions and firm 
specific factors are the driving force behind the capital structure decision (Korajczyk & Levy, 
2002, p.3). Such a proposition is confirmed by the model developed by Hackbarth et al. 
(2006). 
Except for considering the firm specific and macroeconomic factors, another important 
determinant for capital structure decision worthwhile mentioning is the role of countries, such 
as the development of economy, institutional framework and financial system. Different 
countries have different economic structures, legal system and public governance. Each 
country’s financial sector’s contribution for firms’ debt financing and their ability for dealing 
with debt when facing financial distress or bankruptcy are also different. Those factors have a 
strong impact on firms’ capital structure decision. Such a proposition has support from many 
 2 
researchers (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Booth et al. 2001; Antoniou et al. 2008; Kayo & 
Kimura, 2011; Fan et al. 2012) who offer evidence that country specific determinants have 
impact on the firm’s capital structure decision. 
Wald (1999) analyzes and compares empirical data from five countries with different 
institutional framework and financial system in order to test capital structure theories within 
an international context. He presents indirectly that various country specific institutional 
framework have significant impact on capital structures decision via different solution to 
agency problem and information asymmetry problem (Wald, 1999, p.161). Fan et al. (2012) 
point out that the types of financial system and institutional origin, the strength of law and the 
level of corruption in government are often strongly associated with the corporate debt ratio. 
Countries with common law system, such as the U.S.A and U.K., are generally considered to 
be stricter and have a higher transparency, a stronger protection of shareholder and creditor 
rights compared to countries with civil law system. According to Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1999), common law countries have a stronger tendency to be more market-based; while 
countries with civil law tradition, such as France, Germany, Sweden and Japan tend to have 
bank-based system. The financial system is also associated with the firms’ ownership 
concentration. A relative higher degree of ownership concentration characterizes firms in 
bank-based countries. 
In a bank-oriented economy, banks play an important role, such as gathering information and 
monitoring managers’ self-serving behavior, which effectively mitigate the agency problem 
and lower the agency costs. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that Swedish firms are 
generally higher levered than American firms since Swedish banks have significant influences 
on firms; while the relationship between banks and corporations in the U.S.A. is more arms’ 
length market based. However, some researchers, such as Venanzi et al. (2014), claim that the 
debt ratio is expected to be higher with firms under market-based financial system. In addition, 
Figure 1 below (based on the collected data sample of this paper) shows that firms in the 
U.S.A. have higher total debt ratio but lower short-term debt ratio. The contradictory result 
makes it worthwhile conducting a cross-country analysis on capital structure choice. 
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Figure 1. Mean and Median of Leverage Ratio for Large Cap Non-Financial Firms in Sweden 
and the U.S.A. during 2004-2013 
 
 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
Numerous perspectives are taken for capital structure research; while the empirical studies 
mainly are dedicated to single country study about the role of firm specific factors on the 
choice of financing mix, which is consistent with the assertion from Antoniou et al. (2008) 
about two major gaps existing in theoretical literature of capital structure study: 1) the firm 
specific factor alone are often the focus of the major research works; 2) few research works 
dedicated to revealing the relationship between capital structure decision and the types of 
financial system, i.e. bank-based or market-based economy. Therefore, seeking to contribute 
to the empirical study on capital structure if not mitigating the above mentioned gaps in 
theoretical studies, this paper, by conducting a cross-country analysis, concentrates on 
identifying the contribution of macroeconomic conditions and the country specific factors, 
such as the financial orientation of the economy, to capital structure choice. 
Macroeconomics should be a major concern of management since firms operate under certain 
macroeconomic environment and the macroeconomic changes, which are beyond the control 
of management, affect firms’ performance (Oxelheim & Wihlborg, 2008, p.3). 
Macroeconomic variables are interdependent and have strong impact on firm’s performance 
via various channels. Being aware of and having a better understanding of macroeconomic 
shocks and disturbances would help the management minimize the macroeconomic 
uncertainty and make timely appropriate financial decisions (Oxelheim & Wihlborg, 2008). 
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In terms of country effect, it is generally accepted in the academic studies that country effect 
is more linked to firm-specific determinants than to industry-specific determinants (Antoniou 
et al. 2008; Kayo & Kimura, 2011; Venanzi et al. 2014). However, according Venanzi et al. 
(2014), if the country effect is not omitted from regression, it is often merged into the 
interpretation of industry effect, since it is usually “included as industry dummies (fixed 
industry effect), no matter which characteristics they [country effect and industry effect] 
differ for” (Venanzi et al. 2014, p.4). Additionally, Venanzi et al. (2014) include 
macroeconomic scenario in country characteristics. This paper separates country dummy and 
macroeconomic variables from the industry dummies and tries to detect their impact on 
capital structure separately. 
Regarding cross-country comparative analysis, it is not as prevailing as single-country 
analysis among the empirical studies and only a few researchers, such as Wald (1999), Fan et 
al. (2010) and Venanzi et al. (2014), take the focus on a cross-country comparison. Wald 
(1999) chooses relatively big economy countries (France, Germany, Japan, U.K. and the 
U.S.A) as the research objectives and reveals the links between firms’ capital structure 
decision and the country specific legal and institutional characteristics. Fan et al. (2010) 
examine firms in 39 countries, both developed and developing countries, in order to disclose 
the impact of institutional environment on leverage and debt maturity ratios. However, 
Venanzi et al. (2014) analyze small-medium companies operating in bank-based civil law 
countries within European Union. 
This research is thus inspired by the above mentioned research and chooses two countries, the 
U.S.A and Sweden, as the research objectives in order to study the country specific and 
macroeconomic variations’ impacts on capital structure. It is interesting to conduct a cross-
country analysis on these two particular countries due to their differences in economy size, 
institutional origin and financial system. The classification of countries with different law 
origin and financial system is based on the findings of La Porta et al. (1996). The U.S.A is a 
big economy with common law origin and a market-based financial system. However, 
Sweden is a relatively small economy with civil law origin characterized with bank-oriented 
financial system. 
Compared to single-country study, international comparison has certain advantages, which are 
also the driving force behind the decision of cross-country analysis design. The cross-country 
comparison examines the legal and institutional variations across countries and reveals the 
links between those variations and the choice of financing mix via connecting with the 
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classical capital structure theories, such as agency theory. Wald (1999) proclaims as well that 
cross-country comparison “builds a correspondence between legal and institutional 
differences in corporate governance and capital markets” (p.162). 
1.3 Purpose 
This paper examines the determinants of capital structure via a cross-country comparison 
between the U.S.A. and Sweden. With the consideration of firm specific factors, the main 
focus is on researching country effect and macroeconomic impacts on firms’ financing policy 
by providing the answers for the following questions. 
 How do firm specific factors affect different measures of leverage in terms of total 
debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio? Which classical capital 
structure theories are they consistent with? 
 Which and how macroeconomic factors do affect the firms’ choice of capital structure? 
 In terms of country effect, how does financial system orientation (i.e. bank-oriented or 
market-oriented) affect the capital structure? Is it true that Swedish firms in a bank-
oriented economy have higher leverage than American firms in a market-oriented 
economy? 
1.4 Research Limitations 
There are some possible limitations existing in this paper. Firstly, the sample involves very 
few companies in a big range of industries from both countries. For example, there are several 
industries that include only two or three firms. Hence, this could provide a less reliable result 
for the industry impact on the capital structure choice. Secondly, another potential problem 
leading to less reliable results is using book value instead of market value. 
The choice of leverage proxy makes the third limitation, since we chose to use total assets in 
all three ratios of debt instead of total capital. However, some researchers, such as Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), point out that total debt to total capital ratio probably provides the best view 
of firms’ past financing decision, since total assets might lead to a potential risk of biased 
results due to the level of trade credit included, such as unpaid bills and makes up bulk of 
accounts payable (Song, 2005, p.7).  
The outliers in dividend payout ratio account for the fourth limitation. The outliers are not 
eliminated from the sample since they are mostly related to the Swedish firms, which have a 
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limited amount of observations. The removal of any firm will thereby result in less 
representative data. On the other hand, keeping those extreme values might lead to biased 
results. 
Last but not least, the possible endogeneity problem might still exist even if some 
conventional method for tackling endogeneity problems, such as lagged variables and fixed 
effect model, are used in this research. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The paper is constructed in the following way. Section 2 presents relevant theories of the 
capital structure and overviews previous empirical studies on the capital structure. In the same 
section, the U.S.A’s and Sweden’s specific characteristics are outlined, as well. Section 3 
describes and explains methods used in this study. Sample choice, variables, the validity and 
reliability of this research are also discussed here. In Section 4, the findings are presented and 
analyzed using the theories mentioned in Section 2. Section 5 concludes the paper by 
summarizing the study and giving suggestions for further research. 
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2 Literature Review and Country 
Characteristics 
This section presents theories about capital structure, such as M&M Capital Structure 
Irrelevance Proposition, Trade-off theory, Free Cash Flow theory and Pecking Order theory. 
Besides, Legal Origin theory and country characteristics are discussed. Furthermore, the 
previous empirical researches related to the theories are overviewed. 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 M&M Capital Structure Irrelevance Proposition 
The Modigliani and Miller Irrelevance Theorem (M&M theorem), known since 1958, is a 
fundamental theory for the later modern corporate finance theories about the capital structure 
determinants (Villamil, 2008, p.1) and it is set under the five assumptions of an ideal capital 
market, which state that: (1) capital markets are frictionless, i.e. there are no transaction costs 
or no taxes; (2) all market participants share homogeneous expectations, i.e. all value-relevant 
information is available; (3) all market participants are atomistic, i.e. the market price could 
not be affected by any market participants; 4) the firm’s investment program is fixed and 
known to all investors; and 5) the firm’s financing is fixed, i.e. the capital structure is fixed 
(Ogden et al. 2003, p.30-31). 
The main idea of M&M theorem is revealed by several propositions. One of them indicates 
that “[t]he market value of a firm is constant regardless of the amount of leverage (i.e. debt 
relative to equity) that the firm uses to finance its assets” (Ogden, 2003, p.31). In other words, 
the firm’s market value “depends only on the income generated by its assets” (Modigliani, 
1980, p.xiii) and it (the value of the firm) cannot be changed by its management’s financing 
decisions. The second M&M proposition suggests that if cost of equity increases, then debt-
to-equity ratio rises, as well, indicating that the weighted average cost of capital is a linear 
function of the leverage (Villamil, 2008, p.1). 
In addition to these propositions, holding the same perfect capital market assumptions, Miller 
and Modigliani (M&M) (1961) present the irrelevance of dividend policy to the value of 
firm’s equity “as long as the firm’s capital investments and debt policy are fixed” (Ogden et al. 
2003, p.462). Miller and Modigliani (1961) add that dividend policy is also irrelevant to 
investors, since investors are able to regulate the stock’s return by themselves because: 1) if 
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they feel that firm’s dividends are not high enough, and if they need more money than they 
can receive from dividends, investors can sell their stocks seeking to get the expected amount 
of cash (Ogden et al. 2003, p.463); and 2) if investors find that dividends are high enough and 
now they do not need these received cash from dividends, they can reinvest it and buy new 
shares (Ogden et al. 2003, p.463). 
After all, some researches have shown that the M&M theorem has some weaknesses. For 
example, Modigliani and Miller (1963) claimed that taxes also play an important role in 
making decisions about the capital structure because firms can benefit from the tax shield of 
debt by choosing more debt. Moreover, they suggest for a company to hold 100% of debt. 
Hirshleifer (1966) and Stiglitz (1969) argue against the M&M theorem published in 1958 by 
pointing out that the reality is not perfect since there is not just one price in the market (i.e. 
negate that market participants are atomistic), and that a financial distress and bankruptcy 
costs are possible, as well (i.e. frictionless market assumption is denied). Besides, they 
disprove that “firm’s investment program is fixed and known to all investors” (Ogden et al. 
2003, p.31). Myers and Majluf (1984) present the information asymmetry by giving 
arguments against one of the ideal capital market assumptions. In addition, some other 
theories discussed in the following subsections are also contradictory to M&M theory. 
To summarize, many elements, including taxation and transaction costs (relevant to Trade-off 
Theory), information asymmetry and adverse selection (discussed in Pecking Order theory), 
agency costs (analyzed in Free Cash Flow theory), etc., were not taken into consideration by 
Modigliani and Miller in 1958. However, M&M irrelevance theorem is still relevant and 
could not be neglected or rejected in the imperfect world because it leads to a development of 
further theories. And as a support, Miller (1988) points out in his work that “[s]howing what 
doesn’t matter can also show, by implication, what does” (p.100). 
2.1.2 Trade-off Theory 
The Trade-off theory is a theory that relaxes one of the M&M theorem’s assumptions that 
capital markets are frictionless, indicating that transaction costs and taxes do matter to the 
decision of capital structure. Hence, the Trade-off theory is relevant to this study of capital 
structure. 
Before going into more detailed discussion of this theory, it is important to mention that this 
theory consists of two subsections: the Static Trade-off theory, which is based on “a single 
period trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the deadweight costs of bankruptcy” 
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(Frank & Goyal, 2007, p.9) and the Dynamic Trade-off theory, which states that “the firm has 
a target level of leverage and if deviations from that target [the balance of tax savings against 
bankruptcy costs] are gradually removed over time” (Frank & Goyal, 2007, p.9). Since the 
rebalancing time to the optimal capital structure is not estimated, this paper focuses just on 
the Static Trade-off theory. 
To start with, it should be noted that Static Trade-off theory was created seeking to negate the 
Miller and Modigliani’s (M&M) study in 1963, which proposes a capital structure of 100% of 
debt. Several researchers, such as Baxter (1967) and Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), show 
that a capital structure of 100% of debt is too costly for firms due to the bankruptcy costs. 
However, they do not deny the fact that firms could benefit from a tax shield. Therefore, the 
Static Trade-off theory suggests an optimal capital structure “by balancing the advantages of 
borrowing, mainly tax savings, with the cost associated with borrowing including bankruptcy 
costs” (Abdeljawad et al. 2013, p.102), where bankruptcy costs could be also considered as a 
deadweight cost, according to Haugen and Senbet (1978). Moreover, the Static Trade-off 
theory states that firms are already in their optimal point; and, in the case of any deviation 
from the optimal capital structure, firms should rebalance their debt-to-equity ratio, seeking to 
have the highest market value of the firm (Iqbal et al. 2012). 
Additionally, the Static Trade-off theory claims that higher leverage should be held by large, 
profitable and stable firms, since they can take advantage of the interest tax shield; while 
firms with high bankruptcy costs and firms under double taxation on equity financing or high 
personal tax should use less debt (Ghosh et al. 2012). 
To summarize, the Static Trade-off theory indicates that transaction costs and taxes do matter 
to the decision of capital structure and claims that every firm has an optimal capital structure, 
which is determined by the trade-off between the borrowing benefits and borrowing costs. 
2.1.3 Free Cash Flow Theory 
As mentioned earlier, Modigliani and Miller (M&M) model is theoretically valid. However, 
in practice, a firm’s financial decision will not be irrelevant to firm’s performance, if the 
assumptions of perfect capital market are relaxed and the agency problem is taken into 
consideration. Therefore, the agency problem and agency costs are important for capital 
structure decision. Generally speaking, Free Cash Flow theory is a derivative of Trade-off 
theory, which deviates from the key features of Trade-off theory (taxation and bankruptcy), 
but introducing the agency problem and agency costs (Frank & Goyal, 2007, p.11).  
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The Free Cash Flow theory is closely linked to the agency theory, which can be traced back to 
the 18
th
 century when Smith (1776) mentioned in Wealth of Nations that a conflict of interests 
arises between owners of the wealth and managers, who deal with other people’s wealth. 
Berle and Means (1932) developed the agency theory and proclaimed that the source of 
agency problem is the separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932, p.66-68). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defines the agency relationship as “a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (p.5). In 
a firm, the principles are thus the owners/shareholders of the firm and the agents are managers, 
who are hired by the principles to manage the firm. 
The management is supposed to act in line with the shareholders’ interests and ensure the 
shareholders’ interests are satisfied. However, the managers (agents) have their own interests 
and have intentions to take actions to maximize their own interests instead of the shareholders’ 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p.5). Managers’ self-serving behavior includes 
employing the excess cash flow available for empire building and investing in NPV negative 
projects, which leads to overinvestment problem. In order to align the interests of two parties 
and decrease the agency problem, agency costs in forms of monitoring costs, bonding costs 
and shirking costs are generated (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p.6). 
Agency theory is important to a firm’s financial structure decision since the free cash flow has 
a substantial impact on agency costs. Agency conflicts involving managers’ control of free 
cash flow have thus a firm linkage to a firm’s capital structure decision. The agency costs of 
free cash flow can be reduced via introducing debt into the organization structure and 
motivate managers to disgorge the free cash available for empire building or investing in low 
NPV or even negative NPV projects (Jensen, 1986; Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989; Lubatkin & 
Chatterjee, 1994; Roshan, 2009). 
Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis for debt creation indicates that debt has a control or 
monitoring effect on managers’ discretionary spending. These control effects of debt have 
significant impact on capital structure (Jensen, 1986, p.324). Managers have the control over 
the future free cash flows, but they hold a weak promise to distribute the excess cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986, p.324). Debt enables an effective binding between managers’ promise to the 
actual actions of paying out future cash flow. Therefore, “debt reduces the agency costs of 
free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers” 
(Jensen, 1986, p.324). 
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Jensen’s control hypothesis has support from other theorists. Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) 
also point out that debt creation facilitates a more efficient business operation since the free 
cash flow are used for fulfilling the debt obligation instead of investing in negative NPV 
projects. According to Ross (1977), in a world with information asymmetry, debt is 
considered as a costly signal to the market for showing that firms have a stable cash flow 
(p.29). Stulz (1990) finds that a firm’s financing policy is critically dependent on both the 
firm’s free cash flow and its investment opportunities. Firms with negative expected free cash 
flow and poor investment opportunities tend to use debt to ensure that managers have less 
control on free cash flow; while firms with positive expected free cash flow and good 
investment opportunities more prone to issue equity for avoiding underinvestment problem 
(p.4). 
Stulz (1990) continues to argue that debt payments have both positive and negative effects on 
shareholders’ wealth since managers are obliged to pay off debt and reduce investments on 
non-profitable project; while the negative effects come from the potential underinvestment 
due to obligation on debt payments (p.4). The increase of debt also leads to an increase of 
agency costs of debt, which in turn increases the expected costs of bankruptcy. As a result, the 
optimal capital structure is a trade-off between benefit of debt and cost of debt, i.e. the firm’s 
value is maximized at the point where the marginal costs of debt equals to the marginal 
benefit of debt (Jensen, 1986, p.324) and “there is a debt payment that maximizes firm value” 
(Stulz, 1990, p.4).  
In summary, Free Cash Flow theory suggests that debt reduces the agency costs generated by 
the managers’ control of future cash flow. Consistent with Trade off theory, Free Cash Flow 
theory proposes that optimal capital structure is based on the trade-off between benefits and 
costs of debt. 
2.1.4 Pecking Order Theory 
The Pecking Order is another theory relaxing one of the M&M theorem assumptions that all 
value-relevant information is available. The Pecking Order states that information asymmetry 
and adverse selection costs also exist and they lead to a different choice of capital structure. 
Due to these reasons, Pecking Order theory is discussed in this paper. 
When it comes to the Pecking Order theory, it could be seen that it contradicts the Static 
Trade-off theory. The Pecking Order theory argues that there is no optimal capital structure 
and that firm, instead of prioritizing external financing, chooses the internal financing first. 
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The choice is based on the adverse selection and information asymmetry problems caused by 
the fact that managers have more information than investors do (Myers, 1984; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). Holmes and Kent (1991) add that “[o]wner/managers are strongly averse to 
any dilution of their ownership interest and control (which are normally one and the same)” 
(p.145-146), which means that managers are willing to use more retained earnings and excess 
cash instead of issuing new stocks, especially the ones with voting rights. 
Furthermore, Holmes and Kent (1991) and Hamilton and Fox (1998) reveal that in the case of 
insufficient internal funds, managers choose short-term debt first, as long as it does not 
require collateral. If the funding is still not enough, then they will take the long-term debt 
with collateral. Myers (1984) shows that collateralized debt has certain advantages over 
equity since it minimizes information asymmetry, and according to Baskin (1989), since its 
transaction costs are less than the costs of issuing equity. 
The last choice of firms is external equity (Huang & Ritter, 2009; Bistrova, 2011), which 
involves the adverse selection problem. Since managers have better information about the real 
situation and the true value of the firm than outside investors do, they tend to issue equity 
instead of using retained earnings or debt. This is particularly done by overvalued firms. But 
if outside investors feel lack of information and they consider equity riskier, they thereby 
discount the issuing firm’s stock price (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Consequently, 
managers would tend to issue less equity and it leads to another argument supporting the 
preference of retained earnings or debt over equity. 
To summarize, the Pecking Order theory mainly focuses on information asymmetry and 
adverse selection problems that make managers select the least costly and least risky type of 
financing − internal financing (excess cash and retained earnings). If this way of funding is 
not enough, then firms firstly choose a risk-free debt, and the last priority is given to external 
equity. 
2.1.5 Legal Origin Theory 
The Legal Origin is another theory worth mentioning since it argues that the difference in 
legal origins leads to the systematic difference in legal rules and regulations across countries, 
and this difference has impacts on the social and economic outcomes. Therefore, the country 
specific factors, such as legal system, investor protection, ownership concentration, etc., could 
influence capital structure (La Porta et al. 1996). Based on these factors, La Porta et al. (1996) 
group countries into two main categories. The first one, known as the common law, is 
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originated from England and was spread over England’s colonies, including the U.S.A. (La 
Porta et al. 1996). The second one, known as the civil law, is originated from ancient Roman 
law and was spread over Europe but also covers a large part of the world (La Porta et al. 
1996). The civil law is usually subcategorized into three parts: the French civil law, the 
German civil law and the Scandinavian civil law (La Porta et al. 1996). 
Regarding the comparison of legal origins, La Porta et al. (2008) show that the common law 
countries are based on judicial opinions, while the civil law system is based on “statutes and 
comprehensive codes as primary means of ordering legal material” (La Porta et al. 2008, 
p.289) meaning that the property rights are less secured and that the law enforcement is less 
developed in the civil law countries. Moreover, La Porta et al. (1996) reveal that in common 
law system investors have stronger protection and are more secured from the possible loss 
compared with the civil law system. This results in “improved financial development, better 
access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion” (La Porta et al. 2008, p.298). 
According to Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Qian and Strahan (2007), countries 
with capital market oriented financial system are prone to have more long-term debt without 
collateral; while bank based countries commonly use more short-term debt due to the lower 
protections of the investors. La Porta et al. (1999) also point out that “the state has a relatively 
greater role in regulating business in civil law countries than in common law ones” (p.12). 
They proclaim that the civil law system usually has less efficient corporate governance due to 
the same reasons mentioned above. 
To summarize, the Legal Origin theory suggests that legal rules and regulations differ 
systematically due to the different legal origins and the difference in legal rules and 
regulations have significant impacts on social and economic outcomes. The theory groups 
countries into two categories: the common law countries, which are often capital market 
based and tend to use long-term debt, and the civil law countries, which are bank based and 
tend to use short-term debt. 
2.2 Review of Empirical Studies on Capital Structure 
Trade-off Theory or Pecking Order Theory 
The field of capital structure research is often dominated by the Trade-off theory versus the 
Pecking Order theory and the results of the empirical studies are not consistent. Bradley et al. 
(1984) and Auerbach (1985) support the Trade-off theory and conclude that firms appear to 
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achieve target debt ratio. Frank and Goyal (2003), testing Pecking Order theory based on a 
broad cross-section data, conclude that the results deviate from the implications of Pecking 
Order theory. Furthermore, they proclaim in a later research that no current model seems to be 
able to fully explain firm’s capital structure choice. However, Trade-off theory appears to be a 
more powerful explanation due to evidences showing that “direct transaction costs and 
indirect bankruptcy costs appear to play important roles in a firm’s choice of debt” (Frank & 
Goyal, 2007, p.1). 
Titman and Wessels (1988) present mixed results regarding Trade-off theory. By examining 
European firms’ motivations of issuing convertible debt, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) also 
present a mixed support for both theories. However, study from Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1998) support Pecking Order theory. In addition, according to Graham (2000), large firms 
with high profit use less debt, which is against Trade-off theory. He further points out that 
Trade-off theory has difficulties in explaining a firm’s financing choice due to a far higher 
estimated tax benefit than the estimated financial distress costs. 
Since Ross (1977) shows that low quality firms use less debt than high quality firms, the idea 
that capital structure decision takes the monitoring and signaling effect of debt into 
consideration is confirmed by many studies. Yan (2009) proves that a firm’s financial policy 
is used as a form of signaling via examining the abnormal return of debt issuing, especially 
the issuing of convertible bonds (p.36). Zhao et al. (2004) test signaling effect of debt and the 
Pecking Order theory via using the data from farming business. The result is significantly 
consistent with both theories (p.22). 
Regarding financial flexibility, Graham and Harvey (2001) point out that two most important 
determinants of capital structure are financial flexibility and good credit rating (p.187). They 
also find evidences to support both Trade-off and Pecking Order theory but less support for 
impacts of asymmetric information, free cash flow, personal tax and transaction costs on 
capital structure choice. Based on a survey of European managers, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) 
examine the motivation of issuing convertible debt and conclude that financial flexibility has 
a significant impact on issue of debt. 
Macroeconomic Factors 
With regard to the impact of macroeconomic factors on firms’ capital structure, the model 
developed by Hackbarth et al. (2006) confirms the evidence provided by Korajczyk and Levy 
(2002) that debt issues are counter-cyclically (Hackbarth et al. 2006, p.543). The results of 
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their study, supporting the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), also suggest that “the 
firm’s debt capacity depends on current economic conditions … when the firm can adjust its 
capital structure dynamically, both the pace and the size of the adjustments depend on current 
economic conditions” (Hackbarth et al. 2006, p.543). According to Frank and Goyal (2007), 
macroeconomic conditions serve as explanatory factors behind the capital structure choice. 
For example, firms tend to increase the debt ratio when the expected inflation increases. 
Camara (2012) also suggests that debt issuing depends on both firm characteristics and the 
macroeconomic factors, such as inflation (p.117) 
Bank vs. Market Oriented Financial System 
The pioneering study on the impact of institutional difference on capital structure starts from 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), who analyze the empirical data from each of the G-7 countries for 
proving that “institutional differences may drive whatever aggregate differences in capital 
structure that do, indeed, exist” (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p.1423). Booth et al. (2001), by 
analyzing firms in developing countries, also suggest that country specific factors, such as 
institutional features, are reasons behind various capital structure choices across countries. 
According to Antoniou et al. (2008) and Kayo and Kimura (2011), firm specific factors’ 
impact on capital structure is significantly affected by the country’s law origin and financial 
system. Therefore, a firm’s financing decision is the result of combination of both firm 
specific factors and country specific factors (Antoniou et al. 2008, p.25). However, Fan et al. 
(2012) claim that a firm’s financing policy is more affected by the institutional environment 
than by industrial factors. The legal, taxation system and banking system have a profound 
impact on firms’ leverage and debt maturity ratios. “Common law countries have lower 
leverage and use more long-term debt and firms in countries with an explicit bankruptcy code 
have higher leverage and use relatively more long-term debt” (Fan et al. 2012, p.30). 
The results of Fan et al. (2012) are supported by the study of Venanzi et al. (2014), who 
examine countries with homogeneous characteristics in terms of law origin and economy 
orientation. They find out that a firm’s financing policy is significantly influenced by its 
country characteristics directly and indirectly (Venanzi et al. 2014, p.26). They also point out 
that among all the country specific determinants of capital structure, institutional framework 
is the most influential factor (Venanzi et al. 2014, p.26). The quality of the law system 
ensures the effectiveness of the enforcement of the law, such as the protection of the investors, 
which in turn has an influential impact on a firm’s financing decision. Therefore, firms in 
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countries with a strong creditor-oriented law system have higher leverage; while a highly 
protective law system towards shareholders makes the firms employ less debt. Regarding 
economy orientation, firms with higher leverage often appear in the countries with more 
developed bank system (Venanzi et al. 2014, p.26). 
2.3 Country Characteristics 
2.3.1 The United States of America 
The United States of America (U.S.A.) is the largest economy (Smialek, 2015), the third 
largest exporting country (Economics and Statistics Administration, 2014, p.2) and the second 
largest trading country in the world with a negative balance, meaning that it imports more 
goods and services than exports (Financial Times, 2014). However, export plays an important 
role in the U.S. economy and help the U.S. economy to come out of the recent economic 
recession (Economics and Statistics Administration, 2014, p.4). 
The U.S.A. belongs to the common law origin indicating that it has a well-developed law 
system and a better law enforcement, which lead to a higher investor protection and an easier 
access to finance (La Porta et al. 1996; La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 2008). This 
implies that the U.S.A. is more capital market based than bank based. However, it should be 
noticed that the U.S. creditors are also well protected, especially if we take Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 11 into consideration. For example, the Chapter 11 say that the creditors have higher 
voting rights and priority against shareholders indicating that after selling of the firm’s assets, 
the payments to creditors are covered firstly and just then it is compensated for shareholders 
(Sec.gov, 2009). 
Another point worth mentioning is the tax system, especially the tax code to dividends. The 
tax regime is generally classified into three categories: classical tax system, dividend relief tax 
system and dividend imputation tax system. The U.S.A. belongs to the classical tax system, 
which indicates a double taxation on dividend payment, i.e. dividends are taxed not only at 
personal level but also at the corporate level (Fan et al. 2012, p.11). When it comes to the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009, it could be noticed that dividends were the first thing that the 
U.S. firms decreased in order to lower losses. If the dividends cut did not help, and there were 
no other possibilities to avoid the financial distress, then the Chapter 11 was filled.  
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2.3.2 Sweden  
Sweden is a relatively small economy but has a great significance on world economic system 
due to its special economic model called Nordic model (Watkins et al., 2006). The Swedish 
economy is characterized of a large portion of foreign trade, a generous universal welfare 
system, and a relatively high income tax. As a Scandinavian civil law country, Sweden has a 
legal system characterized with the stakeholder system, strong bank influences and less 
protection of external investors. Regarding the enforcement of laws, especially the debt 
contracts, both the U.S.A. and Sweden have an explicit bankruptcy code that clarifies and 
limits creditors’ rights and claims. Table 1 presents the creditor/debtor orientation of 
corporation laws, which shows that both countries sit at the upside of the list for creditor 
protection. However, Swedish law is more creditor oriented compared to the U.S.A., which 
indicates that management in Swedish firms would have a stronger incentive to avoid 
financial distress (Buttwill, 2004, p.7). 
Table 1. Creditor Orientation of Corporate Insolvency Law 
Scale* Country 
1 Ex British colonies, e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore and some other 60 states 
2 Australia, England and Ireland 
3 Germany, Netherlands, Indonesia (and other former Dutch states), Sweden and 
Switzerland 
4 Scotland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Norway 
5 United States and Canada except Quebec 
6 Austria, Denmark and South Africa 
7 Italy 
8 Greece, Portugal, and most Latin America Countries 
9 Belgium, Luxembourg and ex French colonies 
10 France 
* Scale 1 = the most creditor-oriented; Scale 10 = the least creditor-oriented (i.e. the most debtor-oriented) 
Source: Wood, 1995; Wihlborg & Gangopadhyay, 2002; Buttwill, 2004 
With respect to the tax code of dividends, Sweden belongs to the dividend relief system, in 
which dividends are taxed at the personal level with a reduced rate, and it is different from the 
U.S.A., since it has a double taxation on dividend payment (Fan et al. 2012, p.11). Sweden 
also has a bank-based financial system involving few major external non-bank financial actors, 
which is a striking contrast to the financial system in the U.S.A. In the U.S.A, there are many 
different types of banks and non-bank financial actors. Besides, there is a low public trust in 
the state financial system and its actors (Jonung, 2009, p.16-17). The bank resolution policy 
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and the profitability of banking system facilitate the rebound of Swedish economy during the 
current financial crisis (Jonung, 2009, p.14). 
The bank crisis during early 1990s had a severe impact on Swedish economy. It ended up 
with a series of governmental modernization of economic management aiming at stabilizing 
economy, including transition from demand regulation to supply stimulation, deduction of 
state expenditure and taxation, adoption of the floating exchange rate and capital infusion to 
the banking system (Krivorotko, 2009, p.4). As the Swedish economy stumbled out of the 
crisis and enjoyed a fairly long-term upswing brought by an ordered fiscal house, the strong 
exports, and increased domestic demand, almost all the other developed countries were 
paralyzed by a new round of global downturn of 2008-2009. Although Swedish economy slid 
into the global financial crisis as well, it felt less impact of the recession compared to other 
major economies (Irwin, 2011; Calmfors, 2012). Since Sweden is traditionally a bank-
oriented economy, the system-based banks contribute significantly for the rapid bouncing 
back of economy during the recent recession.  
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3 Data and Modeling 
This chapter introduces the method used in the study. First of all, the choices of research 
approach and research design are presented and the motives for that choice are argued. 
Then the data collection process and the source of data are illustrated. Furthermore, the 
selection of variables and hypotheses are discussed. Afterwards, the data processing is 
demonstrated. Finally, the reliability of sources and validity of data are argued, as well. 
3.1 Research Approach 
Seeking to answer the research questions, which are presented on section 1.3 Purpose, both 
quantitative and explanatory research approaches are used. Quantitative method is beneficial 
since it gives more objective and reliable results. The soundness of results arises from the fact 
that numerical values are used and these values are independent of us as researchers. 
Numerical values also have the benefits of involving longer periods of time in the research 
and enabling researchers to analyze data from different angles. What is more, quantitative 
method makes it possible to compare our findings with already existing theories, estimate the 
consistence of these theories, and then test our hypothesis.  
Explanatory research method is used to explain our results, especially, when it comes to the 
relationship between capital structure and its determinants (as firm specific, country specific 
and macroeconomic factors). Since we included a bit different variables compared with other 
academic researches, we believe that explanatory method is appropriate in this paper. 
3.2 Research Design 
Seeking to answer the research questions in an ordered framework, our research follows a 
deductive reasoning. First of all, relevant theories and other academic findings are discussed. 
Secondly, hypotheses are formulated for variables based on these theories and our beliefs. 
Thirdly, data is analyzed and, finally, the outcomes are compared with our expectations in 
order to specify whether regression results are consistent with our hypotheses or not. 
3.3 Data Collection and Source 
The primary source of the collected data is Thomson Reuters DataStream, which consists of 
both macroeconomic data and firm specific financial data across a wide range of industries 
around the world. OECD StatExtract Complete Database, which includes statistical data 
across many OECD’s database, is used for retrieving certain country specific data, such as 
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bank deposit and corporate sector’s bank loan. The full lists of large capitalization (Large Cap) 
companies in both Sweden (53 companies) and the U.S.A. (283 companies) are retrieved from 
the NASDAQ online database. The financial firms are excluded from the sample because they 
usually have different operating structure and firm characteristics from non-financial firms. If 
a company is listed separately with both A and B stocks on the stock market, which is 
especially relevant for Swedish firms, they are not considered as different firms and just one 
is selected, since A or B stock of a firm only represents the different types of stocks of the 
same firm that shares the same characteristics. The sample of firms selected is restricted to 
non-financial Large Cap firms listed on the stock exchange market of each country, i.e. 45 
non-financial Large Cap listed on OMX Stockholm in Sweden and 167 non-financial Large 
Cap listed on NYSE in the U.S.A. are chosen.  
The analysis covers the annual observations over the 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. In 
order to avoid that too many missing observations might lead to less reliable result, firms with 
more than five missing observations are excluded from the sample. As a result, 45 Swedish 
firms and 167 American firms are selected. The final sample contains 212 firms in two 
countries with 1960 observations in total.  
Regarding the selection of variable measurement, proxies for all variables are based on 
previous relevant capital structure studies, except the two country specific variables, i.e. bank 
deposit to GDP ratio and corporate sector’s bank loan to GDP ratio. These two ratios are 
believed to be able to reflect the financial system orientation of a country and they are 
estimated manually by using data retrieved from OECD StatExtract Complete Database. In 
terms of the firm specific variables, it is important to mention that ratios are used in order to 
avoid the possible discrepancy or bias caused by currency conversion and the natural 
logarithm helps to control for both non-linearity and heteroskedasticity problems (Salami & 
Iddirisu, 2011, p.83). In contrast to macroeconomic data that are directly retrieved from the 
Thomson Reuters DataStream, all ratios or logarithms, except total debt over total assets ratio, 
are computed manually, since they are not directly observable in Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. 
3.4 The Variables 
The dependent variables, as the proxy for leverage, include three ratios: total debt to total 
assets, long-term debt to total assets and short-term debt to total assets. The independent 
variables are grouped into two categories: 1) firm specific variables, 2) country specific and 
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macroeconomic variables. Regarding firm specific determinants of capital structure, 
tangibility, firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, dividend payout ratio and non-debt 
tax shields are examined; while in terms of country specific and macroeconomic determinants, 
GDP growth, inflation, interest rate, exchange rate, bank loan supply and corporate loan 
demand are analyzed.  
The industry characteristics are controlled by using industry dummy variables. The country 
dummy variable specifies which country the firm is located in: 0 represents Sweden; 1 
represents the U.S.A. A detailed discussion about each variable is given in the following 
subsections and a summary of hypothesis related to each individual explanatory variables are 
illustrated in the Appendix A Table 1. 
3.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
The total risk of a firm, including both operating and financial risk, is determined by its total 
leverage, since the total leverage is given by the sum of the fixed operating costs and debt 
costs (Brealey & Myers, 2003). The total leverage of a firm thus includes two types of 
leverage: operating leverage and financial leverage. The former generates the operating risk 
and the latter increases the financial risk. A firm’s capital structure, in terms of its financial 
policy, refers to its financial leverage, which is the dependent variable of this paper. 
According to various empirical studies, there are many different measures for financial 
leverage, such as leverage depending on either book value or market value, and leverage 
depending on how detailed level the debt can be decomposed into. 
Some researchers, such as Brealey and Myers (2003) and Song (2005), argue that the 
misspecification of using book value and market value should be small or even unessential. 
The reason behind such an argument is the fact that intangible assets (i.e. R&D, advertisement, 
etc.) are not easy to be sold and the value of such assets often disappears when firms go down 
(Song, 2005, p.5). This would probably lead to a marginal discrepancy between book value 
and market value of total assets, even if the value generated by intangible assets is included in 
the calculation of market value of total assets (Brealey & Myers, 2003; Song, 2005). 
Therefore, the ratios used as proxies for financial leverage in this paper are all based on book 
value. 
The ratio of total debt to total assets is chosen as one of the proxy of leverage. Compared to 
total liabilities, total debt excludes certain liabilities for transaction purposes, such as untaxed 
reserves or accounts payable. Thus, using total debt instead of total liabilities is a more 
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appropriate measure. Some researchers argue that a detailed analysis of corporate debt is 
necessary for the capital structure study, because there is significant difference in the 
determinants of several types of debt, such as long-term debt and short-term debt (Michaelas 
et al. 1999; Bevan & Danbolt, 2000; Song, 2005). Examining leverage only based on total 
debt to total assets ratio might disguise the impact of capital structure determinants on long-
term debt and short-term debt (Song, 2005, p.3). Hence, we also decompose total debt into 
long-term debt and short-term debt in order to examine the impacts of financial leverage 
determinants on the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and short-term debt to total assets. 
3.4.2 The Independent Variable 
Firm Specific 
Tangible Assets - ln [(PP&E + Inventory) / Total Assets)] 
Natural logarithm of the sum of property, plant and equipment (PP&E) and inventory to total 
assets is a proxy for tangible assets. Inventory is chosen to be included in the ratio for two 
reasons: 1) according to Frank and Goyal (2009), inventory covers short-term debt part; and 2) 
according to Kremp et al. (1999) and Gaud et al. (2005), inventories still hold some value 
even if a firm is being liquidated. Tangible assets by itself plays an important role in making 
decisions about capital structure because it could raise leverage since it is as a guarantee for 
lenders (Sayılgan et al. 2006) or it could lower leverage by decreasing information asymmetry 
problem (Gompers, 1995). 
The Static Trade-off theory suggests that firms, holding more tangible assets, are more 
secured and has lower possibility of default, because tangible assets can be used as collateral 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009). This could reduce the borrowing costs, since it lowers interest rate 
payments. Larger amount of tangible assets makes it possible for firms to hold more debt 
because, in the case of any distress, firms would still be able to sell its assets to cover part of 
the liabilities if not the whole liabilities. Thus, there is a positive correlation between leverage 
and tangible assets (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Some researches, such as Allen (1995), Jensen 
and Heckling (1995), Hirota (1999), Michaelas et al. (1999), and Amidu (2007), confirm that 
leverage and tangible assets are related positively. Chung (1993) adds that long-term debt 
would be preferred to short-term debt. 
Taking agency costs into consideration, Free Cash Flow theory supports the idea of positive 
correlation, as well. Harris and Raviv (1991) claim that firms with more tangible assets will 
have greater liquidation value and thereby hold more debt, seeking to mitigate agency 
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problem and lower agency costs. Holding more debt will decrease the amount of free cash 
flow because of the interest payment and debt repayment, and it will also reduce managers’ 
ability to invest (Harris & Raviv, 1991). When it comes to a situation in which a firm does not 
have enough cash, managers are willing to run current operations; while investors probably 
prefer to liquidate firm under such a situation, because cost of debt will outweigh benefits of 
debt and because the value of the firm will be lower than the liquidation value of the firm 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991). It could be seen from the discussion above that the amount of 
tangible assets plays an important role since tangible assets have high liquidation value. 
Hence, a positive relation between tangibility and leverage is found. 
On the other hand, the Pecking Order suggests a negative relation between tangible assets and 
leverage. Gompers (1995) argues that holding more tangible assets mitigates information 
asymmetry problems since the payoff of tangible assets is more transparent or easily 
observable to investors, which decreases the monitoring costs and thereby leads to lower 
demand of debt (Gompers, 1995, p.166). Titman and Wessels (1988) conclude that firms tend 
to hold more debt if they have lower amount of tangible assets. 
We expect leverage and tangible assets to be correlated positively because we believe that 
having more tangible assets, used as collateral, would, first of all, decrease borrowing costs 
and thus in turn lead to higher debt ratio. Secondly, larger amount of tangible assets increases 
the firm’s liquidation value, which is important for shareholders seeking to solve agency costs 
problem. 
Hypothesis 1a: Total debt ratio and tangible assets are correlated positively.  
Hypothesis 1b: Long-term debt ratio and tangible assets are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 1c: Short-term debt ratio and tangible assets are correlated positively. 
Firm Size – ln (Net Sales) 
Natural logarithm of net sales is a good proxy for a firm size, since net sales are less likely to 
be affected by accounting problems compared to total assets (Gaud et al. 2005). Consequently, 
the natural logarithm of total sales is commonly used as a proxy for firm size (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Gaud et al. 2005). Firm size is seen as an indicator 
for the inverse probability of default (Rajan & Zingales, 1995), since it is believed that larger 
firms are less likely to go bankrupt because they are mature and their assets, especially cash 
flows, are less volatile. 
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In the literature, there are several prevailing opinions about the relationship between leverage 
and firm size. For example, the Static Trade-off theory suggests that larger firms have better 
diversified portfolios and face lower financial distress costs, especially when it comes to long-
term debt, due to lower possibility of default (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Chen (2004) also 
shows that larger firms are distinguished by weaker ownership that results in lower manager’s 
control. So managers, seeking to mitigate the risk of personal loss, which would probably 
occur in the case of bankruptcy, will take more debt. Hence, there is a positive relation 
between the leverage and firm size. Marsh (1982) also adds that big firms would prefer to use 
more long-term debt, while smaller firms prefer short-term debt. This could be a result of the 
fact that bigger firms are more confident about their future since they are more mature and 
more stable. So due to these reasons a positive relation for total debt, long-term debt and 
short-term debt to firm size is expected in this study. 
The Pecking Order theory shows a negative relation between leverage and firm size. Some 
researchers, including Titman and Wessels (1988), support the Pecking Order theory and 
imply that larger firms can issue more equity due to decreased adverse selection and higher 
transparency and this is a result of requirement for big firms to reveal more information about 
themselves to outsiders and creditors. Since large firms can issue more equity, they may use 
less debt, i.e. big firms will have lower leverage. Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia (2008) also 
add that bigger firms may be able to use internal funds than external funds to finance firms’ 
investment programs due to lower information asymmetry, which indicates a negative relation 
between leverage and firm size. 
Hypothesis 2a: Total debt ratio and firm size are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 2b: Long-term debt ratio and firm size are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 2c: Short-term debt ratio and firm size are correlated positively. 
Profitability - Operating Income / Net Sales 
Operating income over net income is a good proxy for profitability since it shows how much 
revenue is left for a firm after the deduction of production costs. Profitability by itself is 
important to capital structure because it reveals firm’s ability to survive in the future (Shubita 
& Alsawalhah, 2012). Hence, profitability is taken into consideration in this paper. 
There are two schools of thoughts: the one that supports a positive relation (Static Trade-off 
theory, Free Cash Flow theory) and the other, which suggests a negative relation (Pecking 
Order theory). The Static Trade-off theory claims that profitable firms have lower bankruptcy 
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possibility and, as a result, are able to have higher leverage. In other words, firms may use 
more debt because they are willing to maximize benefits from a tax shield. 
Free Cash Flow theory argues that profitable firms have more free cash flow and it leads to 
increased agency costs of managerial incentives because managers tends invest suboptimally 
in less profitable or even negative NPV projects. Seeking to prevent managers from 
overinvestment, more debt is used. According to Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis of debt, 
higher leverage helps to ensure that excess cash is paid out as dividends to investors but not 
used by managers for unprofitable projects. So holding more debt when firm is profitable, 
leads to a positive relationship between leverage and profitability. This relationship is also 
supported by some other researchers, such as Ross (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), 
Heinkel (1982), Jensen (1986), Hovakimian (2001), Frank and Goyal (2009). 
The Pecking Order theory shows contradictory results, claiming that “[t]he attraction of 
interest tax shields and the threat of financial distress are assumed to be second-order” (Myers, 
1989, p.85). According to Myers (1989), the debt would be preferred just if firm lacks internal 
financing for profitable projects or if it seeks to pay out dividends. For other situations 
internal funds would be used (Myers, 1989). Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that this 
choice of profitable firms is a consequence of decreased agency costs meaning that managers 
are made to act in shareholder’s interest. Myers (1989) also adds that internal fund is favored 
to external funds because of equity has higher issuing costs. Putting all things together, it 
indicates a negative relation between leverage and profitability. This type of correlation is 
supported by a vast majority of researchers, including Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Friend and Lang (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Booth et al. (2001), Fama and French (2002), Chen (2004), Gaud et al. (2005), Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), Wald and Long (2007), Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008), and Kayo and Kimura 
(2010). 
We also agree with majority, who suggest a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage, because we believe that there is no point in taking debt as long as the firm is able to 
cover all costs by using internal financing, and at the same time, the firm is still able to have 
some excess cash. Due to interest payments that often make firms pay back a higher amount 
than they borrowed, debt lowers firms’ free cash flow and possibility to invest in profitable 
projects in the future. 
Hypothesis 3a: Total debt ratio and profitability are correlated negatively.  
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Hypothesis 3b: Long-term debt ratio and profitability are correlated negatively.  
Hypothesis 3c: Short-term debt ratio and profitability are correlated negatively.  
Dividend Payout Ratio - Cash Dividends / Net Income 
The dividend payout ratio is considered as a proxy for firm’s financial situation. Paying out 
dividends decreases the internal funding (retained earnings and excess cash) and leads to an 
increase in external financing, which in turn raises the firm’s leverage if debt is chosen over 
equity. 
There are two schools of thoughts: the one that suggests a negative relationship between 
leverage and dividend payout ratio (Static Trade-off theory and Free Cash Flow theory) and 
the other reveals a positive correlation (Pecking Order theory). The Static Trade-off theory 
suggests that the better firm performs and the less debt it has, the more dividends should be 
paid and vice versa, i.e. the higher leverage a firm holds, the lower dividends should be paid 
out. Since higher level of debt leads to higher interest payments and higher principal amount, 
it results in an increased possibility of default. Therefore, inverse relationship between 
leverage and dividend payout ratio exists. This negative correlation receives support from 
some researchers, such as Jensen et al. (1992), Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994), Crutchley and 
Hansen (1989), Faccio and Lang (2001), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Al-Malkawi (2007), 
Al-Kuwari (2009), Frank and Goyal (2009), Osegbue et al. (2014). 
Furthermore, Rozef (1982), MacKie-Manson (1990), Chang and Rhee (1990) and Asgharian 
(1997) add that tax system also plays an important role because the higher taxes on dividends 
a country has; the lower dividends firms will be willing to pay due to higher costs of tax. 
These researchers also take agency costs into consideration because paying out dividends 
mitigates agency problem, which in turn lowers the amount of free cash flow available to 
managers for overinvestment. Thus, firms with higher dividend payout tend to have lower 
leverage since it is unnecessary to use debt for monitoring managers’ self-serving behavior. 
Agreeing with the arguments discussed above, we expect an inverse relation between 
dividend payout ratio and leverage. 
Based on the Pecking Order theory, a positive relation between leverage and dividends payout 
ratio is concluded. Pecking Order theory proposes that paying out dividends decreases the 
internal funds, even if it mitigates information asymmetry problem, which reduces the 
monitoring costs. When facing investment opportunities, firms with high dividend payout 
might need to resort to the external financing, preferably debt. Myers (1989) argues that less 
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profitable firms that are willing to pay dividends tend to have higher leverage. Allen (1993), 
Shyam-Sunder and Mayers (1999), and Frank and Goyal (2009) also support such arguments 
about positive relationship. 
Hypothesis 4a: Total debt ratio and dividend payout ratio are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 4b: Long-term debt ratio and dividend payout ratio are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 4c: Short-term debt ratio and dividend payout ratio are correlated negatively. 
Growth Opportunities - Net Sales Growth / Total Assets Growth 
Net sales growth to total assets growth is a proxy for growth opportunities. This ratio is 
chosen due to missing data of R&D costs and advertising expenses. Growth opportunities, as 
a firm specific variable, should be taken into consideration since it shows firm’s ability to 
develop its business in the future (Mai, 2006; Hermuningsih, 2013). In order to grow, firms 
need to have enough financing but internal funds alone are often not enough to finance all the 
profitable investment opportunities that firms are facing (Mai, 2006; Hermuningsih, 2013). 
Consequently, firms need to reconsider their capital structure, either by taking more debt 
(which supports Pecking Order theory) or issuing more equity (which is consistent with 
Trade-off theory).  
Pecking Order theory suggests a positive relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities, meaning that firm may use more debt when there are more growth 
opportunities, due to limited amount of internal funds. In other words, if a firm is willing to 
grow, it needs to have higher leverage in order to be able to invest more in profitable projects. 
Michaelas et al. (1999) add that firms may use more short-term debt than long-term debt, and 
according to Gaud et al. (2005), using more short-term debt is due to creditors’ unwillingness 
to lend long-term debt. Additionally, as Myers (1977) claims, using more short-term debt is 
also a consequence of the fact that growing firms tend to invest suboptimally. Due to these 
reasons we expect both total debt and short-term debt to be positively correlated with growth 
opportunities. 
The Trade-off theory suggests a negative correlation between leverage and growth 
opportunities because issuing debt involves higher costs than equity issuing, which leads to 
higher possibility of financial distress and thereby increases the expected financial distress 
costs. According to Chen (2004), it is because of the fact that firms with growth opportunities 
are more likely to have greater amount of intangible assets than tangible, meaning that they 
have lower collateral and their liquidation value is lower. Under such circumstances, creditors 
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would request higher risk premium that results in higher cost of capital. Therefore, Jung et al. 
(1996) suggests using more equity instead. Myers (1977) also supports Jung’s et al. (1996) 
idea but adds that equity is preferred since firms with high level of debt tend to foregone 
profitable projects. 
When considering the agency problems, the same inverse relation is proposed by the Free 
Cash flow theory due to increased agency costs of debt. It suggests that shareholders in 
growing firms try to expropriate wealth from creditors (Myers, 1997; Jensen, 1986) seeking to 
“have more flexibility to invest suboptimally” (Chen, 2004, p.1347), i.e. seeking to invest in 
projects without caring about NPV sign. 
Hypothesis 5a: Total debt ratio and growth opportunities are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 5b: Long-term debt ratio and growth opportunities are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 5c: Short-term debt ratio and growth opportunities are correlated positively. 
Non-Debt Tax Shield – Depreciation / Total Assets 
The ratio of annual depreciation to total assets is considered as a proxy for non-debt tax 
shields (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Wanzenried, 2002; Song, 2005), since depreciation is 
regarded as one important non-debt item. Tax benefit of interest reduces the tax burden for 
firms and thus tax shield is an important reason behind a firm’s adjustment on its capital 
structure. Tax shield is related not only to the size of debt, but also to the size of non-debt 
items, such as depreciation and investment tax credits. The non-debt tax shields probably 
serve as a less expensive alternative for tax reduction (Cloyd, 1997). Therefore, the corporate 
tax shield related to the tax deduction of depreciation also affects firms’ capital structure 
choices. 
According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), the tax shield generated from debt financing can 
be substituted by the tax benefit from non-debt items. The larger non-debt tax shields are, the 
less amount of debt is employed by the firms (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Bowen et al. 1982; 
MacKie-Mason, 1990; Givoly et al. 1992; Allen, 1995; Cloyd et al. 1997; Ayers et al. 2001). 
Schulman et al. (1996) claim that tax shields generated from depreciation reduces the taxable 
income to a great extent, which indicates that using more debt might not generate additional 
tax benefit. Therefore, non-tax items, such as depreciation, have a significant impact on firm’s 
financing decision. 
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The tax substitution hypothesis proposed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) indicates a 
negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and firms’ leverage, since there is an 
inverse relationship between depreciation and tax benefit from debt (Wanzenried, 2002). 
Agreeing with DeAngelo and Masulis, we expected that non-debt tax shields negatively affect 
firms’ capital structure due to the substitution effect of tax benefit from non-debt items 
discussed in the previous paragraph. However, Bradley et al. (1984) argue for a positive 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and firms’ debt ratio in the case of investing greatly 
in intangible assets, which creates greater amount of depreciation and tax credits. The positive 
relation, explained by Graham (2004), is due to the positive correlation between non-debt 
items in forms of depreciation and profitability and/or investment. 
Hypothesis 6a: Total debt ratio and non-debt tax shield are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 6b: Long-term debt ratio and non-debt tax shield are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 6c: Short-term debt ratio and non-debt tax shield are correlated negatively. 
Country Specific and Macroeconomic Variables 
GDP Growth 
GDP growth is often considered as the measure of a country’s overall state of economy. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995) consider GDP growth as a proxy for the demands of 
firms’ financing because it measures a country’s economic growth and “the growth 
opportunities available to firms” (p.353). They conclude that GDP growth has a significant 
inverse relationship with firms’ leverage, especially the total debt ratio and the short-term 
debt ratio (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996, p.357). Other empirical studies also confirm 
that GDP growth has significantly negative impact on the capital structure (Gajurel, 2005; 
Gajurel, 2006; Bokpin, 2009; Dincergok and Yalciner, 2011; Camara, 2012). However, Booth 
et al. (2001) and Venanzi et al. (2014) discover GDP growth increases firms’ leverage, i.e. a 
positive correlation between GDP and leverage. 
We expect a negative correlation between GDP growth and leverage based on the theoretical 
argument that “growth options should not be financed by debt” (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996, p.353), which can be linked to Pecking Order theory. As mentioned 
earlier, higher GDP growth often leads to higher profitability and more investment 
opportunities, which increase firms’ financing needs. Facing a comparative larger excess cash 
flow generated from increased profitability under high GDP growth, firms prefer the internal 
cash financing for investment to debt financing. 
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Hypothesis 7a: Total debt ratio and GDP growth are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 7b: Long-term debt ratio and GDP growth are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 7c: Short-term debt ratio and GDP growth are correlated negatively. 
Inflation Rate 
Inflation is considered as one of the important explanatory factors for financing policy due to 
its considerable influence on the riskiness of the financing (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 
1996, p.353). Empirical studies suggest that inflation is usually unanticipated and thus 
uncertain. The uncertainty of inflation has impact on the capital costs and expected cash flow 
from investments (Hatzinikolaou et al. 2002). It thus influences firms’ decision on investment 
(Chen & Boness, 1975), which in turn affects firms’ business risks. When facing business risk, 
such as insolvency risk, firms probably choose to adjust their leverage due to the uncertainty 
of tax shield of debt (Hatzinikolaou et al. 2002).  
Regarding inflation rate as the determinant of capital structure, there are mixed findings in 
empirical studies. Some empirical studies claim that inflation is positively related to the 
leverage (Sett & Sarkhel, 2010; Hanousek & Shamshur, 2011; Mokhova & Zinecker, 2014); 
some argue for a negative relation between inflation and debt ratio (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic 1996; Gajurel, 2006; Venanzi et al. 2014); while some other researchers claim 
that firms’ financing decision or at least the book leverage is not affected by inflation at all 
(Bastos et al. 2009; Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996) conclude that inflation has a significant negative 
impact on leverage, especially on short-term debt and total debt (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996, p.357). Such a conclusion receives supports from Gajurel (2006) and 
Venanzi et al. (2014). Booth et al. (2001) via cross-country study based on data from 
developing countries. They further point out that such an inverse relationship also applies to 
the long-term debt ratio. However, Gajurel (2006) discovers that inflation has a significant 
positive relationship with long-term debt ratio. 
We expect a negative correlation between inflation rate and leverage based on the argument 
that higher inflation leads to higher risk of debt financing. Seen from the supply side, 
investors would be reluctant to lend during the high inflation period due to uncertainty of their 
return of investment. From the perspective of borrower, since the debt contracts are often 
written in nominal term, a high inflation often leads to a high interest rate, which in turn raises 
the cost of capital. If the inflation is not reflected adequately in the interest rate, the real value 
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of debt repayment will be reduced, which might increase leverage ratio for firms. However, 
the business risk caused by inflation uncertainty will eventually make firms choose to take on 
less debt. 
Hypothesis 8a: Total debt ratio and inflation are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 8b: Long-term debt ratio and inflation are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 8c: Short-term debt ratio and inflation are correlated negatively. 
Interest Rate 
Interest rate, measured by the prime lending rate, is considered important to firms’ financing 
policy due to its close relation to costs of capital, the tax benefit and bankruptcy risk. Interest 
rate has an obvious relationship with the costs of debt. Higher interest rate leads to a higher 
cost of capital and thus increases firms’ risk of financial distress or bankruptcy; while interest 
payments are tax deductible and, hence, bring the tax benefit to firms by decreasing the 
taxable income. The tax effect on firms’ financing decision is conventionally stronger when 
there is a high interest rate (MacKinlay, 2012, p.1). 
The positive effect of interest rate on leverage stemming from tax benefit and the negative 
impact caused by the bankruptcy risk are confirmed by findings of Abzari et al. (2012). In 
addition, consistent with Trade-off theory, Cekrezi (2013) claims that interest rate has a 
positive impact on capital structure (p.94). However, Antoniou et al. (2002) suggest an 
inverse relationship with leverage ratio. Such a proposition is also confirmed by 
Hatzimikolaou et al. (2002) and Dincergok and Yalciner (2011). We also believe that interest 
rate will affect negatively the debt ratio due to its positive impact on the capital costs. 
Hypothesis 9a: Total debt ratio and interest rate are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 9b: Long-term debt ratio and interest rate are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 9c: Short-term debt ratio and interest rate are correlated negatively. 
Exchange Rate 
Trade weighted index is chosen as a proxy for exchange rate and exchange rate is considered 
to have an impact on firms’ capital structure decision due to the country characteristics. We 
choose the United States of America and Sweden as our target countries of study. Sweden is 
heavily dependent on export, but its home currency, Swedish Krona, is not considered as an 
international settlement currency. Foreign currencies thereby will be used as settlement 
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currencies during the international trading. As mentioned earlier in the section 2.3.1 The 
United States of America, the U.S.A. is the second largest trading country in the world. 
Although the country’s exports only take approximately 14% of GDP (Economics and 
Statistics Administration, 2014, p.2), it is the third biggest exporting country in the world. In 
addition, almost 30% of its GDP growth during 2009 and 2013 came from the export growth 
(Economics and Statistics Administration, 2014, p.2). Because of its steady growth, export 
has played a more and more important role in the U.S. economy since 2010, which ensures 
the country’s economy coming out of the economic recession. What is more, the multi-
national firms in both countries have opportunities to access the international capital market 
and borrow foreign debt. It is clear that exchange rate risk will have impact on the financing 
policy of firms, especially those involving in international business. 
Froot (1990) mentions that the impact of exchange rate risk on the cost of capital depends on 
whether the risk of exchange rate is diversifiable and whether investors are willing to pay for 
a risk premium if exchange rate risks cannot be avoided (p.313). From the macroeconomic 
viewpoint, the foreign direct investments could cause the fluctuation of exchange rate, which 
in turn has a powerful influence on firms’ financing policy (Broll et al. 2005). For firms 
involving international business, especially importing and exporting companies, fluctuation of 
exchange rate causes a fluctuation of cash flow, which, according to Pecking Order theory, 
affects capital structure decision (Abzari et al. 2012, p.133). Some economists claim that, 
besides agency costs and political costs, risk premium for exchange rate uncertainty is also 
one of the reasons that multinational companies are prone to use lower leverage (Lee & Kwok, 
1988; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al. 1997). 
We assume that multinational companies have possibility to take advantage of the exchange 
rate and export more during high exchange rate, but importing more during the low exchange 
rate. This behavior probably has a positive impact on the firms’ cash flow, which lower firms’ 
leverage based on Pecking Order theory. We expect a negative correlation between exchange 
rate and leverage. 
Hypothesis 10a: Total debt ratio and exchange rate are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 10b: Long-term debt ratio and exchange rate are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 10c: Short-term debt ratio and exchange rate are correlated negatively. 
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Financial System Orientation - Bank Deposit / GDP and Corporate Bank Loan / GDP 
The difference in financial system as a determinant of capital structure choice has been 
confirmed by many researchers. Rajan and Zingales (1995) claim that the influence of the 
banks plays a significant role in deciding the financing policy, even if other institutional 
differences have influential impact on the financing policy (p.1437; p.1441). They argue that 
“difference between bank oriented countries and market oriented countries is really reflected 
in the choice between public (stocks and bonds) and private financing (bank loans) rather than 
in the amount of leverage” (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p.1441). From the aspect of corporates’ 
demand of bank loan, we thus consider bank loan to GDP as one of the indicators of the 
economy orientation. Regarding the supply of bank funds, we consider the ratio between bank 
deposits and GDP as a proxy, which also provides indication for the type of financial system. 
According to Fan et al. (2010), bank deposits to GDP can be considered as a proxy for banks’ 
supply of funds because it measures how much funds the banking sector have access to (p.11). 
Demirguc-Kunt and Masksimovic (1996) find a significant negative relationship between 
debt ratio (both long-term and short-term debt) and stock market development, and a positive 
relationship between bank sector’s size and firms’ capital structure (p.366). Compared to the 
countries with market-based financial system, bank-oriented countries have relatively less 
well-developed capital market, since they have weaker legal system and public enforcement 
of law in terms of protection of outside investors (Fan et al. 2010, p.5). Moreover, countries 
with stronger creditor rights and protection often have larger banking sector (Demirguc-Kunt 
& Maksimovic, 1999, p.321) and they tend to use more debt (Fan et al. 2010, p.10). Thus, we 
expect that both ratios (bank supply and bank demand) have positive impact on the leverage, 
especially on the short-term debt financing. 
Since Sweden is considered to be more bank-based and the U.S.A. is regarded as a market-
based country, bank influence on firms in Sweden is much stronger than that in the U.S.A. 
We thus expect that Swedish firms use more debt, especially short-term debt; while firms in 
the U.S.A. use more long-term debt.  
Hypothesis 11a: Total debt ratio and supply of bank funding are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 11b: Long-term debt ratio and supply of bank funding are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 11c: Short-term debt ratio and supply of bank funding are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 12a: Total debt ratio and corporate demand of bank loan are correlated positively. 
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𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
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𝑘=14
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1𝐷11 + ⋯ + 𝜆𝑡𝐷𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
Hypothesis 12b: Long-term debt ratio and corporate demand of bank loan are correlated 
positively. 
Hypothesis 12c: Short-term debt ratio and corporate demand of bank loan are correlated 
positively. 
Hypothesis 13a: Total debt ratio and country dummy are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 13b: Long-term debt ratio and country dummy are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 13c: Short-term debt ratio and country dummy are correlated negatively. 
3.5 Modeling and Econometrics Tests 
3.5.1 Model Structure 
Academic literature provides various econometric models for investigating the capital 
structure determinants. Panel data model with both fixed effects and random effects is a 
commonly used model among financial research. This paper employs panel data regression 
analysis, as well, due to certain advantages of the model. 
Panel data model contains data set from both time series and cross-sectional elements (Brooks, 
2008, p.487). It thus can address a broader range of issues and deal with more complicated or 
complex problems (Brooks, 2008, p. 488), since panel data regression examines the same 
cross-sectional unit over a period of time. Compared to the simple time series Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression, a panel data regression contains more observations and variations, 
which results in an increased power of test by increasing degrees of freedom and a reduced 
problem of multicollinearity (Brooks, 2008, p.488-489). In addition, the individual 
heteroskedasticity of data can be controlled by fixing either time dimension or cross-sectional 
dimension, which in turn tackles the endogeneity caused by missing variables. 
In attempting to compare the country effect on financing mix and the impact of capital 
structure determinants not only on total leverage, but also on long-term debt and short-term 
debt, the following linear equations are estimated in EViews based on the fixed effect panel 
data model. 
 
 
 
(1) 
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𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
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𝑘=8
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1𝐷11
+ ⋯ + 𝜆𝑡𝐷𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
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𝑘=9
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜆1𝐷11 + ⋯ + 𝜆𝑡𝐷𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where dependent variable Leverage represents all three measures of leverage and during the 
test it is replaced by either total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio or short-term debt ratio. In the 
regression (3), independent variable Macro represents all six macroeconomic variables (GDP, 
inflation, interest rate, exchange rate, supply of bank funding and demand of bank loan) and it 
is replaced by one of the six variables individually during the test. The index i denotes the 
firm (i = 1, 2, …N; N = 212), and t denotes the year (t = 1, 2, …, T; T = 10, i.e. observations 
from 2004 to 2013). λ1D11 + ⋯ + λtDTt represents the period fixed effect, since the cross-
country comparison with macroeconomic variables indicates a control of heterogeneity in the 
time dimension. 𝑣𝑖𝑡  is the error term. The rest of the explanatory variables are: 
TANG = Tangibility of assets, i.e. ln [(PP&E + inventory) / total assets] 
F_SIZE = Firm size, i.e. ln (net sales) 
PROF = Profitability, i.e. operating income / net sales 
DIV = Dividends payout ratio, i.e. cash dividends / net income 
GROW = Growth opportunities, i.e. annual sales growth / annual assets growth 
NONTAX = Non-debt tax shields, i.e. depreciation / total assets 
COUN = Country dummy, where 0 represents Sweden and 1 represents the U.S.A. 
GDP = Annual GDP growth rate 
INFL = Inflation rate 
INTR = Interest rate, i.e. the prime lending rate 
EXCH = Exchange rate 
DEPO = Supply of bank funding, i.e. bank deposit / GDP 
LOAN = Demand of bank loan, i.e. corporate sector’s loan / GDP  
(2) 
(3) 
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3.5.2 Econometrics Tests 
Heterogeneity Test 
When a panel data regression is pooled, the regression is estimated under the assumption that 
there is no dependence or relation among observations, since the data is treated like a simple 
time series or cross-sectional regression alone (Brooks, 2008, p.488). However, in practice, 
such an assumption is not always valid and error terms are often correlated within either time 
dimension or cross-sectional dimension, which leads to the heterogeneity problem. Some 
other sources for heterogeneity include heteroskedasticity and parameter differences, such as 
random parameters (Stack Exchange, 2011). 
Heterogeneity problem could cause inefficient coefficient, underestimated variability and 
thereby incorrect inference. However, it can be tested in various ways, such as pooled 
regression residual plot, redundant fixed effects test, and Chow test. The first two tests are 
conducted in this study for checking the potential heterogeneity problem. The test result will 
be discussed in the section 4.1 Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Matrix and Heterogeneity Test. 
Endogeneity Discussion 
Endogeneity, defined as the correlation between independent variables and the error terms 
(Roberts & Whited, 2011, p.6), is quite a common problem for empirical finance studies. 
Endogeneous variables lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimation and there are four 
causes behind endogeneity: measurement error, omitted variables, reverse causality or 
simultaneity, and selection bias (Roberts & Whited, 2011, p.6). 
In this research, variables and proxy selection, especially the firm specific variables, are based 
on the previous empirical studies. According to economic intuition and the previous empirical 
study, endogeneity, caused by measurement error, does not exist in the explicit sample data 
used in this paper. Selection bias often only appears in treatment effects model, which is not 
employed in this research and thus no selection bias related endogeneity exists in the explicit 
data sample. 
With regard to omitted variables related endogeneity, no research can ensure all variables 
with explanatory power would be included, since the capital structure decision is such a 
complicated issue, which involves both observable and unobservable factors. For example, 
variables selected in this paper do not include the corporate governance variables, which 
 37 
could, as well, have impacts on financing policy. However, fixed effect in panel data model 
employed in this research effectively controls the endogeneity caused by omitted variables. 
When it comes to reverse causality or simultaneity, it is almost impossible to argue for 
reversal causality between firms’ capital structure decision and country specific or 
macroeconomic condition. As far as firm specific variables are concerned, most of the 
empirical studies do not argue about the endogeneity problems since their study focus is on 
the capital structure determinants. However, endogeneity does exist. For example, leverage 
can influence profitability and tangibility. A few researchers exert their efforts on those 
endogeneous variables and offer solutions to improve the results. Based on the argument that 
financial leverage affects cost of capital and thus has impacts on the profitability and stock 
prices of firms (Miller, 1977; Myers, 1984; Sheel, 1994), Yoon & Jang (2005) propose that 
the impact on firms’ profitability from financial leverage is especially significant when firms 
are characterized with a high-cost nature. Mahmoudi (2014) also confirms that firms’ 
profitability depends on the capital structure at a high significant level. The causality between 
financial leverage and profitability thus leads to a potential endogeneity. 
Moreover, Campello and Giambona (2011) also mention the possible endogeneity between 
capital structure and tangibility. The tangibility of assets refers to the mix of used assets type 
in a firm, which is strongly affected by the industry where a firm operates (Campello & 
Giambona, 2011, p.2). It could be argued that a firm’s capital structure decision has impact on 
its assets tangibility, for example, a firm takes debt to finance purchases of tangible assets or 
disposes certain assets for debt payment. Trading of tangible assets, especially disposal of 
tangible assets, depends on the assets redeployability or the liquidity of market. Although the 
classical theories suggest that tangible assets are often illiquid, Campello and Giambona 
(2011) still prove the endogeneous problem arising from assets tangibility by studying real 
estate firms, which usually have a relatively high redeployability of tangible assets and which 
face a more liquid secondary market of the tangible assets, such as land. 
In attempt to mitigate the potential estimation bias caused by simultaneity, the general 
convention of lagged variables is employed in this research, i.e. all the independent variables 
are one year lagged. However, it is worthwhile mentioning that the lagged variables might not 
solve all the estimation biases caused by simultaneity due to the persistence of variables. For 
example, the operating income and sales are persistent over time, i.e. current year’s operating 
income or sales depends on the previous year’s operating income or sales. 
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3.6 Validity and Reliability 
Seeking to ensure validity and reliability of our results, three main steps were taken. First of 
all, reliable sources, such as academic journals and course literature, are used for the 
theoretical ground for this paper. Secondly, the data for variables is collected from global 
databases, i.e. Thomson Reuters DataStream, OECD StatExtract Complete Database and 
Economics and Statistics Administration, without any specific expectations from us. Lastly, 
theories and previous findings are used as a fundament for the discussion of results. 
Meanwhile, skeptical and logical thinking is applied for data analysis in order to avoid biased 
viewpoints. 
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4 Results and Analysis 
This chapter presents the discussion of the results for group descriptive statistics, correlation 
matrix and heterogeneity test. Afterwards, the regression results are illustrated and explained 
with a detailed analysis via comparison between the regression results and our hypotheses. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Matrix and 
Heterogeneity Test 
The group descriptive statistics for the sample data (Appendix A Table 2 Panel 1) reveals that 
all the variables, except firm size, are not normally distributed, since the Jarque-Bera test 
rejects the null hypothesis of normality. In addition, variable DIV presents an extreme skew 
of the distribution. The mean for variable DIV is 9.5764; which is over 32 times of the 
median value. This gives a skewness of 44.02 and a kurtosis of 1943.25. The reason behind 
such an extreme skew of the distribution is the existence of a few really extreme values in the 
data sample that pushes up the mean value. Those extreme values, mostly related to the 
Swedish firms, are not excluded from samples due to the limited amount of observations from 
Swedish firms. This might bias the regression result. It is worthwhile pointing out that the 
sub-sample group descriptive statistics (Appendix A Table 2 Panel 2 & 3) reveal that the mean 
and median of bank funding supply (bank deposit to GDP ratio) in Sweden (1.3207 and 
1.2935, respectively) is higher than that in the U.S.A. (0.6910 and 0.7744, respectively). 
Correlation matrix (Appendix A Table 3) spots no multicollinearity problem since the 
correlation coefficients of any two variables are all less than 0.8. In addition, neither the 
pooled regression residual plot (Appendix B Figure 1, 2 & 3) nor the redundant fixed effects 
tests results (Appendix A Table 4) present any signs of heterogeneity in the sample data. Both 
F-test and Chi-square test results in the redundant fixed effects tests indicate that period 
dummies are not significant at all and thus do not reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity. 
4.2 Regression Results and Analysis 
4.2.1 Firm Specific Effect 
Regression results (Appendix A Table 5) reveal that tangibility, firm size and profitability 
have significant positive impacts on total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio. In addition, firm 
size has also positive correlation with short-term debt ratio at 1% significance level; while 
dividends payout ratio is only positively correlated to long-term debt ratio at 5% significance 
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level. Growth opportunity and non-debt tax shield have no significant impact on any leverage 
ratios. The significant variables will be individually analyzed in the following section. 
Tangibility  
Consistent with our prediction (Hypothesis 1a & 1b), tangibility has highly significant (at 1%) 
positive correlation with both total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio. However, the result 
(Appendix A Table 5) shows a negative relationship (-0.0009) between tangibility and short-
term debt ratio, which is against our expectation (Hypothesis 1c), even if such a negative 
correlation is insignificant. The results also reveal that the influence of tangibility on both 
total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio is quite small with coefficients of +0.0078 and 
+0.0047, respectively. 
The positive relationship between tangibility and leverage can be explained by Free Cash 
Flow theory. As discussed earlier in Section 3.4.2 The Independent Variable, firms with more 
tangible assets often have higher liquidation value and usually hold more debt in order to 
mitigate agency problem. First of all, managers are prone to overinvest the free cash flow 
available in lower NPV or even negative NPV projects, even if shareholders might prefer 
receive dividends. Such behavior is against shareholder value maximization and leads to 
agency problem between managers and shareholders. On the other hand, since managers are 
considered as representatives of shareholders, their suboptimal investing style also creates 
agency problem between shareholders and creditors. That is because such an investing style 
brings about an expropriation of wealth from creditors to shareholders. In order to protect 
themselves, creditors will ask for tangible assets as collateral for their lending. From the 
perspective of debt supply, creditors would be more willing to lend to firms with larger 
tangible assets; while from the perspective of firms, higher amount of tangible assets make it 
possible to take on more debt, since firms with large tangible assets often have greater 
liquidation value. Considering the controlling effect of debt, taking on debt would be an 
effective way for monitoring managers’ discretionary spending and binding managers’ weak 
promise on distribution of excess cash flow to the actual action of future cash flow payout. 
Therefore, debt is probably a better device for high tangibility firms to mitigate agency 
problems and reduce agency costs compared to other possible means. Then it is logical to see 
such firms present a higher leverage. 
Static Trade-off theory contributes to explain the tangibility’s positive impact on capital 
structure, as well. When tangible assets are used as collateral, the risk borne by creditors is 
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reduced, which in turn lower the risk premium requested by creditors, i.e. the cost of debt 
decreases. This provides an explanation for firms with higher leverage when holding great 
amount of tangible assets. 
It is also worth noting that the positive relationship between tangibility and long-term debt 
ratio gives support to debt maturity matching principle, which proposes that long-term debt is 
often used to finance the tangible assets; while short-term debt is usually considered as a 
financing for non-fixed assets. The regression result also supports Chung’s (1993) argument 
about positive relationship between tangibility and long-term debt. This could be explained by 
the fact that firms tend to hold tangible assets, including fixed assets, for a longer period of 
time, since they are often considered to have longer assets life cycle. Hence, a firm holding 
more tangible assets is more confident about its ability to sell these fixed assets in the future 
for covering the debt, which results in a higher possibility for such firms to use long-term debt. 
Firm Size 
The regression results (Appendix A Table 5) reveal that firm size is a highly significant 
determinant of capital structure and the results are consistent with our expectations 
(Hypothesis 2a, 2b & 2c) for all three measures of leverage. The influence of firm size on 
total debt ratio (+0.0354) is the strongest among all the significant firm specific variables; 
while the influence on the long-term debt ratio (+0.0063) and short-term debt ratio (+0.0074) 
is much weaker. But it is worthwhile mentioning that the impact of firm size on long-term 
debt is actually the second highest among all the significant firm specific variables. These 
results are consistent with our expectation that firm size is positively correlated to all three 
measures of leverage. 
Trade-off theory and the relationship between firm size and credit rating provide explanations 
for the positive impact of firm size on capital structure. As we know, firm size is one of the 
important elements for determining a firm’s credit rating, since it usually indicates a firm’s 
bankruptcy probability. It is commonly expected that large firms are less possible to fail or 
default, and probably have a higher credit rating, due to their diversification of business and 
greater amount of collateral as guarantee. Such firms thus face lower financial distress costs 
and lower bankruptcy risks, especially in the case of long-term debt. In addition, creditors 
often request lower risk premium when lending to firms with high credit rating due to the fact 
that such firms are safer and lenders bear less risks. This reduces the costs of debt issuing for 
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larger firms. Thus, lower bankruptcy risk would also reduce firms’ costs of borrowing, and in 
turn the cost of capital. 
Taking all things into consideration, it is reasonable that larger firms are prone to use more 
debt, especially debt with longer maturity. The positive correlation between firm size and 
leverage supports the Trade-off theory. It is also interesting to notice that, according to the 
coefficients of variables in regressions (Appendix A Table 5 Panel 2 & 3), firm size has a 
stronger impact on short-term debt than on long-term debt. 
Profitability 
Appendix A Table 5 presents contradictory results to our predictions (Hypothesis 3a, 3b & 3c) 
of the correlation between profitability and leverage. Based on the Pecking Order theory, we 
expected that profitability has a negative impact on all three leverage measurements. However, 
regression results support the Trade-off theory and confirm a positive correlation between 
profitability and all three debt ratios. Profitability’s impact on total debt ratio and long-term 
debt ratio are highly significant (5% and 1%, respectively); while its impact on short-term 
debt ratio is insignificant at all. Regression results also show that impact of profitability on 
leverage is higher on long-term debt ratio (+0.0482) than on total debt ratio (+0.0268). 
Explanations behind the positive correlation between profitability and leverage are more 
related to tax shield benefits, bankruptcy risk and agency costs. As discussed earlier in the 
section 3.2.2 Independent Variables, firms with higher profitability can afford and intend to 
use more debt since they have lower risk of bankruptcy and are able to enjoy more tax shield 
benefits brought from higher leverage. When considering agency problem and agency costs, 
debt is probably an efficient device for high profitable firms to control managers’ 
discretionary disposal of excess cash flow. This is because these firms are able to take on 
more debt without adding too much risk into the business and the monitoring effect of debt 
helps high profitability firms to mitigate the agency problem and lower agency costs. 
In conclusion, it is reasonable for profitable firms to use more debt due to the reasons 
discussed above. And these results are consistent with Trade-off theory and Free Cash Flow 
theory. 
Dividend Payout Ratio 
The regression results (Appendix A Table 5) present that dividend payout ratio is positively 
correlated with total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio, which is against our prediction 
(Hypothesis 4b & 4c). Unfortunately, the positive correlation between dividend payout ratio 
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and total debt ratio is insignificant. But the correlation to long-term debt ratio is significant at 
5%, even if the impact is really small (+1.61E-5). In terms of short-term debt, the result is 
consistent with our expectation of negative correlation (Hypothesis 4c), but it is insignificant. 
The positive correlation between dividend payout and leverage can be explained by Pecking 
Order theory. Firms with high dividends payout are more possible to face a shortage of 
internal cash source for investment. When external financing is needed, debt is preferred over 
equity as argued in Pecking Order theory, because equity is often more costly than debt. In 
addition, dividends tend to be persistent and it thereby can be a long-term burden for firms. 
When facing temporary problems of financial flexibility and investment opportunities, firms 
that pay out higher amount of dividends are forced to resort to the external financing, 
especially long-term debt. Therefore, it is reasonable to find that long-term debt obligation 
increases with the dividend payout. 
Another possible explanation for the positive relationship is related to the fact that debt is 
only used for financing dividends payout. Since dividends are signaling the financial situation 
of firms, management are often reluctant to reduce or stop dividends, which may cause that 
firms take on debt to finance dividends payout if there is a temporary financial difficulty or 
constraints. 
The two situations discussed above may occur separately or at the same time. But still it does 
not change the result that leverage and dividend payout ratio are correlated positively, which 
is consistent with Pecking Order theory. 
 
4.2.2 Macroeconomic and Country Effect 
Regarding macroeconomic and country specific variables, when regression includes all the 
variables (Appendix A Table 5), country dummy is only positively correlated to total debt 
ratio at 5% significance level; while GDP, inflation rate, exchange rate, and demand of bank 
loan do not have significant impact on any type of leverage ratio. Interest rate is negatively 
correlated to total debt ratio but positively correlated with short-term debt ratio both at 5% 
significance level. Moreover, supply of bank loan has a significant impact on total debt ratio 
but not on the other two leverage ratios. When controlling firm specific, country specific, 
industry dummy variables, and each macroeconomic variables individually (Appendix A 
Table 7 & Table 8), none of the macroeconomic factors, except interest rate (significant 
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positive impact on short-term debt ratio at 5%), actually have significant impact on either 
long-term or short-term debt ratio. 
It is also worthwhile mentioning that, according to Appendix A Table 6, country dummy 
presents a highly significant correlation (1% significance) with both total debt ratio and long-
term debt ratio but a negative correlation with short-term debt ratio at 5% significance level, if 
only controlling the firm specific, country specific and industry dummy variables. The 
following subsections will analyze each significant variable in detail. 
Interest Rate 
As it is mentioned above, interest rate has a significant negative impact (-0.0116) on the total 
debt ratio but a significant positive impact (+0.0037) on the short-term debt ratio (Appendix A 
Table 5). The former is consistent with our expectation (Hypothesis 9a), while the latter is 
against our prediction (Hypothesis 9c). Unfortunately, the positive correlation between 
interest rate and long-term debt ratio is inconsistent with our expectation (Hypothesis 9b) and 
the correlation is insignificant, as well. Nevertheless, finding that interest rate has significant 
impact on certain measures of leverage (i.e. total debt ratio and short-term debt ratio) gives a 
support to the Trade-off theory. Since the interest rate affects firms’ costs of capital and in 
turn the bankruptcy risk, it is plausible that interest rate is indeed a significant determinant of 
capital structure. 
The negative correlation between interest rate and the total debt ratio indicates that firms tend 
to use less debt when the interest rate is high. This result is congruous with the findings by 
Antoniou et al. (2002), Hatzimikolaou et al. (2002) and Dincergok and Yalciner (2011). 
Besides, Trade-off theory provides certain explanation for this inverse relation. Financial 
distress and bankruptcy risk are considered to increase with the rise of capital cost, which is 
also positively related to the interest rate. Firms thereby are reluctant to take on more debt 
when the interest rate is high, since the high interest commitments would lead to higher risk 
of financial distress or bankruptcy. 
The positive relation between interest rate and short-term debt supports tax benefit argument 
in the Trade-off theory and is consistent with MacKinlay’s (2012) argument about tax effect 
on firms’ financing. A high interest rate generates a high tax benefit and thus firms are 
probably prone to take more debt in order to enjoy the tax benefit, as long as they do not 
overpass their optimal leverage ratio. In this study, a short-term interest rate (the prime 
lending rate) is employed as the proxy for the variable - interest rate. Short-term interest rate 
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often indicates the volatility in both capital market and the money market. Interest rate is 
commonly believed to be negatively related to stock price, i.e. a high interest rate results in 
low prices on the stock market. Therefore, during the time of high interest rate, investors are 
reluctant to invest in the equity market and firms in need of financing thus tend to choose debt 
over equity. In addition, compared to the interest payment on long-term debt, interest 
payment on short-term debt is a commitment for shorter period. With higher interest 
commitment but for shorter period, firms probably face less bankrupt risk while enjoying the 
tax benefits, compared to the high long-term interest commitment. 
In conclusion, it is reasonable that interest rate is correlated negatively with total debt and 
positively with short-term debt due to the arguments discussed above. And the Trade-off 
theory could provide certain explanation to these relationships. 
Financial System Orientation and Country Effect 
Appendix A Table 5 presents that supply of bank funding is positively correlated to total debt 
ratio and long-term debt ratio with the coefficient of +0.0992 and +0.0240, respectively, but 
negatively correlated to short-term debt ratio (-0.0241). The former is consistent with our 
expectation (Hypothesis 11a & 11b), while the latter is opposite to our prediction (Hypothesis 
11c). However, only the impact on total debt ratio is significant at 5%, while impacts on the 
other two ratios are not significant at all. 
In this paper, bank deposit to GDP ratio is regarded as the proxy for supply of bank funding, 
which in turn gives indication of financial system orientation of the country. As mentioned 
earlier, the sub-sample group descriptive statistics (Appendix A Table 2 Panel 2 & 3) reveal 
that Sweden has higher bank deposits to GDP ratio (both mean and median) and Figure 2 
below shows that Sweden (3.3%) has a much bigger banking sector than the U.S.A. (0.9%). 
These facts confirm the argument that Sweden has a more bank-based financial system, while 
the financial system in the U.S.A. is more market-based. Therefore, the positive correlation 
between supply of bank funding and total debt ratio indicates that the higher supply of bank 
funding, the higher total debt ratio, i.e. Swedish firms are higher levered than American firms, 
which is consistent with our prediction (Hypothesis 13a). However, the country specific 
variable (country dummy) gives different results. 
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Figure 2. Size of Banking Sector (as a Ratio of Banking Sector Assets to GDP) in 2009 
 
Source: Statista. Available at http://www.statista.com/statistics/267352/size-of-the-banking-sector-in-selected-
countries (Retrieved May 7, 2015) 
 
As shown in the Appendix A Table 5, dummy variable for country shows a positive relation to 
the total leverage (+0.2362) at a significance level of 5%. Regarding long-term debt ratio and 
short-term debt ratio, country variable has a positive impact on long-term debt ratio (+0.0555) 
but a negative influence on short-term debt ratio (-0.0292). However, neither of them is 
significant. If only the firm specific, country dummy and industry dummy variables are 
controlled in the regression (Appendix A Table 6), regression results for country variables 
become highly significant at 1% with a positive correlation to both total debt ratio (+0.0567) 
and long-term debt ratio (+0.0511); while an inverse correlation to short-term debt ratio         
(-0.0093) at 5% significance level. 
The positive relationship between country variable and total debt ratio indicates that Swedish 
firms actually use less total debt than firms in the U.S.A., which is opposite to our expectation 
(Hypothesis 13a) and the result indicated by supply of bank loan. Consistent with our 
expectation (Hypothesis 13b & 13c), when decomposing total debt into long-term debt and 
short-term debt, Swedish firms use more short-term debt; while firms in the U.S.A. use more 
long-term debt. Such a result confirms the contradiction raised in the introduction section of 
this paper and it can be explained from the following six aspects:  
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1. The Impact of Investors’ Preference 
The country effect on short-term debt ratio can be explained by the investors’ preference 
effects on firms’ capital structure choice. When debt and equity require different risk 
premium, the investors would have a preference to hold debt or equity instruments. This 
preference has impact on firms’ financing decision. As discussed earlier, banking sector size 
in Sweden is much bigger than in the U.S.A. In addition, the Swedish banks had traditionally 
monopoly on the deposits and have a significant control of the liquidity supply in the Swedish 
economy. Even if the monopoly has been abolished for over ten years, among all Swedish 
credit institutions, banks are still the biggest lender (Sveriges Riksbank, 2013). Figure 3 
below reveals that banks are the biggest player in the Swedish financial market; while Figure 
4 shows that Swedish banks account for almost 50% of the total lending to the public. 
Compared to pension funds and insurance companies, banks probably have comparative 
advantage on providing short-term funding to firms. Hence, it is reasonable that Swedish 
firms take more debts with shorter maturities. 
Figure 3. Players on the Swedish Financial Market in 2010 
 
Source: European Banking Federation. (2012). European Banking Sector Facts and Figures 2012, pp. 7. 
Available at http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/FF2012.pdf (Retrieved May 7, 2015) 
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Figure 4. Lending by Credit Institutions to the Public in 2003-2012 (SEK billion)  
 
Source: Sveriges Riksbank (2013). The Swedish Financial Market, pp. 73. Available at 
http://www.riksbank.se/Documents/Rapporter/Finansmarknaden/2013/rap_finansm_130830_eng.pdf (Retrieved 
May 7, 2015) 
2. Bank Deposit Insurance 
Bank loan deposit insurance is another factor worthwhile considering for firms’ financing 
choice. Deposit insurance is a protection to the depositors from banks’ insolvency, which 
effectively reduces the risk of bank runs (Fan et al. 2010, p.11). Banks tend to provide more 
credit or more debt with longer maturities to borrowers when the deposit insurance is high. 
Since deposit insurance is 79% in the U.S.A and only 15% in Sweden (Demirguc-Kunt et al, 
2014), it is plausible that American firms tend to use more long-term debt. 
3. Information Asymmetry Problem 
In terms of information asymmetry problem, banks play an important role. The strong bank 
influences result in a close relation between Swedish banks and firms’ management. Such a 
close relationship ensures the investment information is known by the creditors and mitigates 
the information asymmetry problem. This monitoring effect not only minimizes the agency 
costs but also lowers the cost of debt due to the reduced risk premium, requested by the 
creditors, which in turn affects firms financing decision, i.e. Swedish firms tend to use more 
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debt, especially short-term debt. However, in the more market-oriented American financial 
system, the arm-length market relation between creditors and firms makes it difficult for 
investors to know the investment information and hence creates information asymmetry 
problem. Creditors request a higher rate of return on their lending for the risk taken. Higher 
interest rate on debt leads to higher cost of capital, which defers firms’ short-term borrowing. 
4. Development of Capital Market 
Considering the development of capital market, the capital market in the U.S.A. is more 
developed than in Sweden. Table 2 and Table 3 below show that both the stock market 
capitalization and the debt securities market capitalization are much larger in the U.S.A. The 
highly developed the U.S. capital market ensures a broader supply of funding and less 
information asymmetry between external investors and firms, which in turn would lower the 
costs of equity. As a result, American firms tend to consider equity issuing over short-term 
debt to meet the financing needs. 
Table 2. Outstanding of Debt Securities in Sweden and the U.S.A. in 2004-2013 ($ billions) 
  Amount Outstanding of Debt Securities ($ billions) 
Period Sweden the U.S.A. 
2004 127,17 21 546,98 
2005 144,72 23 200,77 
2006 169,45 25 123,52 
2007 224,88 27 458,76 
2008 270,30 29 408,06 
2009 328,25 30 746,47 
2010 368,39 30 918,86 
2011 404,16 31 884,21 
2012 436,69 32 811,08 
2013 484,87 33 983,70 
Source: Economic Research Division Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2014) Available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/release?rid=327 (Retrieved April 17, 2015)  
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Table 3. Stock Market Capitalization of GDP in Sweden and the U.S.A. in 2004-2012, % 
  Stock Market Capitalization % of GDP 
Period Sweden the U.S.A. 
2004 98,71 132,98 
2005 103,83 129,61 
2006 136,48 140,20 
2007 125,56 137,78 
2008 49,14 79,75 
2009 100,61 104,57 
2010 119,00 114,53 
2011 83,49 100,79 
2012 103,06 115,50 
Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream 
5. Legal Origin Perspective  
Legal origin theory proposes that different legal origins with different legal rules and 
regulations have great impact on economic outcomes. The strength of legal system and 
corporate governance influence greatly financing policy of firms. The U.S.A. is a common 
law country with efficient corporate governance and strong law system that provides higher 
protection to outside investors. The good law enforcement and explicit bankruptcy codes, 
such as Chapter 11 and Chapter 7, ensure a good financial distress resolution and protection 
of investor rights. The well-defined bankruptcy procedures facilitate a smooth corporate 
reorganization and makes default less painful or less onerous, which also provides incentives 
for American firms to use particularly more long-term debt. Thus, the stronger legal system 
and law enforcement in the U.S.A. lead to lower amount of short-term debt but higher amount 
of long-term debt, and higher external financing in form of equity, as well. 
Sweden takes Scandinavian civil law origin with strong stakeholder influences and less 
protection of external investors. Its bankruptcy codes and regulations related to debt contracts 
are more creditor-oriented. As mentioned earlier in the section 2.3 Country Characteristics, 
both Sweden and the U.S.A. have high creditor protection; while Swedish law is more 
creditor-oriented comparing with American law, which makes management in Swedish firms 
prone to avoid financial distress and use less debt. This would be a plausible explanation 
behind the positive correlation between country effect and total debt ratio. Additionally,  
Table 5 below shows that in our data sample, both Swedish firms and American firms have a 
higher proportion of long-term debt in the total debt, which results in the effect of long-term 
debt outweighs that of short-term debt. Thus, the country effect presents a positive correlation 
to the total debt ratio, i.e. American firms take higher amount of total debt. 
 51 
Table 4. Proportion of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in the U.S.A. and Sweden over 
2004-2013, % 
  Short-Term and Long-Term Debt of Total Debt, % 
  Sweden The U.S.A. 
Period Short-Term Debt  Long-Term Debt Short-Term Debt  Long-Term Debt 
2004 23,21 76,79 44,98 55,02 
2005 28,42 71,58 44,40 55,60 
2006 29,74 70,26 44,06 55,94 
2007 30,17 69,83 46,11 53,89 
2008 28,53 71,47 47,31 52,69 
2009 26,74 73,26 43,50 56,50 
2010 27,37 72,63 41,84 58,16 
2011 27,05 72,95 44,30 55,70 
2012 27,01 72,99 46,00 54,00 
2013 27,19 72,81 46,25 53,75 
6. Tax Code on Dividends Payment 
Tax treatment of dividends and the control hypothesis for debt creation in Free Cash flow 
theory provide another explanation for the positive country effect on total debt ratio. As 
mentioned earlier in the section 2.3 Country Characteristics, The U.S.A. employs double 
taxation on dividends payment; while Sweden has a dividend relief system. Considering the 
agency problem and agency costs, dividends payout is believed to be able to mitigate the 
agency problem due to certain controlling effect of dividends on managers’ discretionary 
spending. Facing higher taxation on dividends, the American firms are probably reluctant to 
pay higher dividends compared to the Swedish firms. Consequently, with lower dividends 
payout, American firms are more prone to have higher leverage due to the controlling or 
monitoring function of debt for mitigating agency problem. 
 
4.2.3 Industry Effect 
In terms of industry effects (Appendix A Table 5), five out of twelve industry dummy 
variables (basic materials, energy, healthcare, technology and telecommunications) used in 
this study do not have explanatory power for total debt ratio structure and five industry 
dummy variables (basic materials, consumer goods, consumer service, miscellaneous, and 
public utility) have significant explanatory power for long-term debt ratio. However, for 
short-term debt ratio, industry dummy has no explanatory power at all. Among those industry 
dummies with explanatory power, public utility has the strongest impact (+0.3780 for total 
debt ratio; +0.2180 for long-term debt ratio) on capital structure choice. Comparing the results 
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from macroeconomic effect and industry effect, it can be seen that industry has both stronger 
explanatory power and greater impact on the leverage; while considering all the significant 
variables (at 5% significance level) in the regressions, industry effect is revealed to be more 
influential on capital structure, since industry dummies appear to have higher coefficients. 
 
4.2.4 Summary of Regression Results 
The important empirical findings of this study are summarized as following: 
 Consistent with our expectations (Hypothesis 1a & 1b), tangibility has a significant 
positive relation to both total debt and long-term debt. However, the impact on the 
capital structure is small (+0.0078 and +0.0047, respectively). Tangibility and short-
term debt have insignificant negative relation and it is contradictory to our hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 1c). The significant results also provide support to Static Trade-off theory 
and Free Cash Flow theory. 
 Firm size and all three measures of leverage have a significant and positive relation 
that confirms our expectations (Hypothesis 2a, 2b & 2c) and supports Trade-off theory. 
It is worth mentioning that among all significant firm-specific variables, firm size has 
the highest impact on total debt (+0.0354) and the second greatest influence for long-
term debt (+0.0063). 
 Contradictory to our hypothesis (Hypothesis 3a, 3b & 3c), profitability has a positive 
effect to all the measures of leverage. However, for short-term debt the results are 
insignificant. As for the long-term debt, the impact of profitability is the greatest 
(+0.0482) among all the significant firm specific variables. The relationship between 
profitability and total debt is significant, as well, and the effect is relatively high 
(+0.0268) compared with coefficients of other variables. The significant results 
support both Trade-off theory and Free Cash Flow theory. 
 Supporting Pecking Order theory, the impact of dividend payout ratio on both total 
debt and long-term debt are inconsistent with our expectations (Hypothesis 4a & 4b), 
since a positive relation is found; while the impact on short-term debt confirmed our 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 4c) that a negative correlation exists. When it comes to the 
significance, only the long-term debt is meaningful, while other two are not. 
 Both growth opportunities and non-debt tax shield are insignificant at all. However, 
expectations for growth opportunities to total debt and to long-term debt are consistent 
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with our results (Hypothesis 5a & 5b); while the rest do not confirm our hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 5c, 6a, 6b & 6c). 
 Consistent with our prediction (Hypothesis 7a, 7b & 7c), GDP has negative impact on 
all three measures of leverage; while against our expectation (Hypothesis 10a, 10b & 
10c) exchange rate is positively related to all three measures of leverage. Inflation 
negatively affects total debt ratio and short-term debt ratio, which confirms our 
prediction (Hypothesis 8a & 8c); while its positive impact on long-term debt ratio is 
against our expectation (Hypothesis 8b). 
 Supporting Trade-off theory, interest rate and total debt ratio are negatively correlated, 
which is consistent with our prediction (Hypothesis 9a); while against our expectation 
(Hypothesis 9b & 9c), it is positively correlated to both long-term debt ratio and short-
term debt ratio. However, except the significant impact of interest on the total debt 
ratio and short-term debt ratio, all the other macroeconomic factors (GDP, inflation 
rate, exchange rate) do not have significant influence on capital structure. 
 The supply of bank funding has a significant positive correlation with both total debt 
ratio and long-term debt ratio; while an insignificant correlation with short-term debt 
ratio. The former is consistent with our prediction (Hypothesis 11a & 11b); while the 
latter is not (Hypothesis 11c). 
 Consistent with our prediction (Hypothesis 12a & 12c), impact of demand of bank 
loan on total debt ratio and short-term debt ratio is positive; while the impact on long-
term debt is against our expectation (Hypothesis 12b). However, none of the result is 
significant. 
 Against our prediction (Hypothesis 13a), a significant positive country effect on total 
debt is found, when regression controls all the variables (firm specific, country 
specific, macroeconomic variables and industry dummies), while the country effect on 
the other two leverage measures (long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio) is 
insignificant. However, when excluding macroeconomic variables, significant country 
effects are found for all three measures of leverage. The positive country impact on 
total debt is against our prediction (Hypothesis 13a); while the positive impact on 
long-term debt ratio and negative impact on short-term debt ratio are both consistent 
with our expectation (Hypothesis 13b & 13c). 
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 Industry does have impact on firms’ financial leverage and public utility tends to have 
higher leverage. Moreover, industry has also a stronger explanatory power than 
macroeconomic factors and it is revealed by our data that it has a stronger influence on 
capital structure among all the significant variables. 
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5 Conclusion and Discussion 
The conclusion based on the analysis of regression results is presented in this chapter and the 
suggestions for future study are discussed, as well. 
5.1 Conclusion  
This paper, utilizing panel data regression with period fixed effects, examines how firm 
specific, country specific and macroeconomic factors affect firms’ capital structure decisions 
based on the sample of firms in Sweden and the U.S.A. A cross-country analysis is conducted 
to compare the country effect revealed in the regression results. Three measures for leverage 
(total debt to total assets ratio, long-term debt to total assets ratio and short-term debt to total 
assets ratio) are employed and the decomposition of total debt into long-term debt and short-
term debt allows a more detailed analysis of the impact of capital structure determinants. The 
empirical evidences of this research prove that 1) significant difference exists in the 
determinants of three leverage measures (total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term 
debt ratio); 2) country effect does exist when firms in different countries decide financing 
policy; 3) industry has stronger explanatory power on leverage compared to the 
macroeconomic factors; 4) Trade-off theory and Free Cash Flow theory provide more 
explanation than Pecking Order theory. The most important findings of this research are 
summarized as following: 
 In terms of firm specific determinants, among all the significant variables, firm size 
has the strongest impact on total debt ratio and profitability has the biggest influence 
on long-term debt ratio. With regard to short-term debt ratio, only firm size presents a 
significant influence. 
 Financial system orientation of the country does have effect on firms’ capital structure. 
More developed bank system leads to higher financial leverage. However, regression 
results of country effect reveal that firms in the U.S.A (as a market-based economy) 
are actually higher levered in terms of both total debt and long-term debt; while 
Swedish firms (as a bank-oriented economy) are prone to use more short-term debt. 
 The seemingly contradictory results between financial system orientation and country 
effect are analyzed from six aspects (investor's’ preference, bank deposit insurance, 
information asymmetry problem, development of capital market, legal origin 
perspective, and tax code on dividends payment). Consequently, we conclude that the 
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effect of long-term debt overweighs that of short-term debt, which makes American 
firms actually have higher financial leverage in terms of total debt. 
 Based on the data from this research, it seems that industry dummies have stronger 
impact on both total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio among all the significant 
variables (at 5% significance level). Compared to the macroeconomic determinants, 
industry dummies have both greater explanatory power and stronger impacts on 
capital structure. 
 The significant positive impact of tangibility, firm size and profitability on leverage 
provides support to Trade-off theory and Free Cash Flow theory. Interest rate’s effect 
on capital structure can be explained by Trade-off theory, as well. However, the 
significant correlation between dividend payout ratio and leverage confirms Pecking 
Order theory. 
 
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
From this study, we realize that capital structure is a complicated but interesting topic and 
some other aspects could be taken into consideration for future study. 
Firstly, we suggest selecting some other proxies for the future research because this study 
reveals that almost all macroeconomic variables present insignificant results. This could stem 
from the inappropriate choice of proxy. For example, the volatility of exchange rate instead of 
the exchange rate index can be selected as explanatory variable. Volatility of exchange rate 
might be a better proxy since it indicates the fluctuation, which might affect business risk of 
the firm and, consequently, its decision on the capital structure. Including measurements of 
corporate governance, such as structure of board and ownership, could also help to explain the 
choice of the capital structure. 
Secondly, we suggest studying the influence of financial crisis on the capital structure 
decision by separating the whole data sample into two sub-samples: 1) pre-crisis period, and 2) 
post-crisis period, including the crisis period. However, the pre-crisis period should be 
extended to a longer period of time in order to avoid the potential problems with estimation of 
regression due to limited number of observations. The comparison study about pre-crisis and 
post-crisis decisions on firms’ financing policy is interesting and highly worthwhile to 
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conduct since it would provide more valuable empirical insights for theoretical study of 
capital structure. 
Thirdly, another angle to analyze the capital structure could be examining industries 
individually for each country. Since it is already known that many differences exist between 
industries, such as the degree of business risk and asset risk, separation of industry would give 
a better understanding about which firm-specific, country-specific or macroeconomic factors 
have the strongest impact on the capital structure decision for a specific industry in a specific 
country. 
Finally, including more countries with similar characteristics (i.e. countries sharing same law 
origin or same type of financial system) in the similar cross-country analysis leads to more 
reliable results due to the increased observations. Such an analysis could also be conducted to 
examine the capital structure choice in a set of countries with homogenous characteristics in 
terms of financial system orientation and institutional origin. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1. Hypotheses Summary 
Determinants Variable  
Measurement 
(Proxy) 
Expected effect on capital structure 
Firm-specific 
Tangibility TANG 
Ln 
[(PP&E+Inventory) 
/ Total assets] 
Hypothesis 1a: Total debt ratio and tangibility of 
assets are correlated positively.  
Hypothesis 1b: Long-term debt ratio and 
tangibility of assets are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 1c: Short-term debt ratio and 
tangibility of assets are correlated positively. 
Firm size F_SIZE Ln (Total Assets) 
Hypothesis 2a: Total debt ratio and firm size are 
correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 2b: Long-term debt ratio and firm 
size are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 2c: Short-term debt ratio and firm 
size are correlated positively. 
Profitability PROF 
Operating Income / 
Net Sales 
Hypothesis 3a: Total debt ratio and profitability 
are correlated negatively.  
Hypothesis 3b: Long-term debt ratio and 
profitability are correlated negatively.  
Hypothesis 3c: Short-term debt ratio and 
profitability are correlated negatively.  
Dividend DIV 
Dividend Payout 
Ratio, i.e. Cash 
Dividends / Net 
Income 
Hypothesis 4a: Total debt ratio and dividend 
payout ratio are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 4b: Long-term debt ratio and 
dividend payout ratio are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 4c: Short-term debt ratio and 
dividend payout ratio are correlated negatively. 
Growth 
opportunities 
GROW 
Sales Growth / 
Total Assets 
Growth 
Hypothesis 5a: Total debt ratio and growth 
opportunities are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 5b: Long-term debt ratio and growth 
opportunities are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 5c: Short-term debt ratio and growth 
opportunities are correlated positively. 
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Determinants Variable 
Measurement 
(Proxy) Expected effect on capital structure 
Non-debt 
Tax Shields 
NONTAX 
Depreciation / 
Total Assets 
Hypothesis 6a: Total debt ratio and non-debt tax 
shield are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 6b: Long-term debt ratio and non-
debt tax shield are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 6c: Short-term debt ratio and non-
debt tax shield are correlated negatively. 
Country-specific and Macroeconomic determinants 
GDP growth GDP GDP Growth 
Hypothesis 7a: Total debt ratio and GDP growth 
are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 7b: Long-term debt ratio and GDP 
growth are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 7c: Short-term debt ratio and GDP 
growth are correlated negatively. 
Inflation rate INFL Inflation Rate 
Hypothesis 8a: Total debt ratio and inflation are 
correlated negatively.  
Hypothesis 8b: Long-term debt ratio and 
inflation are correlated negatively.  
Hypothesis 8c: Short-term debt ratio and 
inflation are correlated negatively.   
Interest rate INTR 
Prime Lending 
Rate 
Hypothesis 9a: Total debt ratio and interest rate 
are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 9b: Long-term debt ratio and interest 
rate are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 9c: Short-term debt ratio and interest 
rate are correlated negatively. 
Exchange 
rate 
EXCH Exchange Rate 
Hypothesis 10a: Total debt ratio and exchange 
rate are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 10b: Long-term debt ratio and 
exchange rate are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 10c: Short-term debt ratio and 
exchange rate are correlated negatively. 
Loan supply DEPO 
Bank Deposit / 
GDP  
Hypothesis 11a: Total debt ratio and supply of 
bank funding are correlated positively.  
Hypothesis 11b: Long-term debt ratio and supply 
of bank funding are correlated positively.  
Hypothesis 11c: Short-term debt ratio and supply 
of bank funding are correlated positively.  
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Determinants Variable 
Measurement 
(Proxy) Expected effect on capital structure 
Loan 
demand 
LOAN 
Corporate Bank 
Loan / GDP 
Hypothesis 12a: Total debt ratio and corporate 
demand of bank loan are correlated positively.  
Hypothesis 12b: Long-term debt ratio and 
corporate demand of bank loan are correlated 
positively. 
Hypothesis 12c: Short-term debt ratio and 
corporate demand of bank loan are correlated 
positively.  
Country COUN 
Dummy Variable 
for Indicating 
Countries   
(Sweden = 0;     
The U.S.A. = 1) 
Hypothesis 13a: Total debt ratio and country 
dummy are correlated negatively. 
Hypothesis 13b: Long-term debt ratio and 
country dummy are correlated positively. 
Hypothesis 13c: Short-term debt ratio and 
country dummy are correlated negatively. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 1: Descriptive Statistics for firms in Sweden and the U.S.A 
  
TOTAL 
DEBT 
RATIO 
SHORT 
DEBT 
RATIO 
LONG 
DEBT 
RATIO 
TANG F_SIZE PROF DIV GROW NONTAX GDP INFL INTR EXCH DEPO LOAN 
 Mean 0,3916 0,2256 0,0445 -0,8587 16,5334 0,3951 9,5764 1,5164 0,0307 1,7121 2,1068 4,0005 77,9958 0,8272 0,6141 
 Median 0,3772 0,2081 0,0260 -0,9719 16,5787 0,2888 0,2961 0,7097 0,0278 2,3000 2,6700 3,2500 76,0200 0,8087 0,4224 
 Maximum 1,4904 0,7440 0,6567 16,9692 19,7051 4,2986 1,64E+04 2,3690 0,1046 5,7000 3,8100 8,2500 87,1000 1,6570 1,5542 
 Minimum -0,1859 0,0000 0,0000 -17,7342 12,5574 -0,5059 -215,2889 -6,0404 0,0012 -5,0500 -2,8000 -0,3200 70,8700 0,0639 0,3717 
 Std. Dev. 0,2053 0,1349 0,0587 2,5706 1,1362 0,3768 371,3968 5,6682 0,0162 2,1856 1,3399 2,1858 4,7841 0,3431 0,3863 
 Skewness 0,6179 0,6312 3,0749 2,9798 -0,0519 2,1263 44,0246 3,6640 0,8691 -1,1566 -0,8673 0,5743 0,4307 -0,0971 1,5401 
 Kurtosis 4,2791 3,3233 18,6656 36,7177 3,1049 14,0662 1943,2540 15,6614 3,9002 4,1659 3,1622 2,4349 1,9170 3,6550 3,6249 
 Jarque-Bera 257,56 138,24 2,31E+04 9,55E+04 1,77 1,14E+04 3,07E+08 1,99E+08 311,97 546,35 247,09 133,41 155,90 37,99 804,22 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,4120 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 Sum 765,20 440,76 86,95 -1,68E+03 3,23E+04 772,00 18,71E+04 2,96E+03 59,93 3,35E+03 4,12E+03 7,81E+03 1,52E+05 1,62E+03 1,20E+03 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 82,30 35,56 6,72 1,29E+04 2,52E+03 277,29 2,69E+08 6,27E+06 0,51 9,33E+03 3,51E+03 9,3E+03 4,47E+04 229,97 291,48 
 Observations 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 
    
 
                          
Panel 2: Descriptive Statistics for firms in Sweden 
  
TOTAL 
DEBT 
RATIO 
SHORT 
DEBT 
RATIO 
LONG 
DEBT 
RATIO 
TANG F_SIZE PROF DIV GROW NONTAX GDP INFL INTR EXCH DEPO LOAN 
 Mean 0,3409 0,0567 0,1729 -0,2016 16,9459 0,1052 42,9689 0,0995 0,0312 1,9013 1,2628 1,7536 81,6001 1,3207 1,3258 
 Median 0,3542 0,0385 0,1587 -1,0200 17,1374 0,0944 0,3903 0,5391 0,0277 2,7600 1,2000 1,7500 83,4800 1,2935 1,4516 
 Maximum 1,2469 0,4054 0,6762 16,9692 19,7051 0,5725 1,64E+04 1,5969 0,1022 5,7000 3,4000 4,0000 87,1000 1,6570 1,5542 
 Minimum 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -4,6347 12,8998 -0,5059 -4,4717 -1,9000 0,0012 -5,0500 -0,5000 0,2500 71,8000 0,8329 1,0039 
 Std. Dev. 0,1933 0,0618 0,1265 4,0184 1,2365 0,0972 798,9201 1,5246 0,0193 3,0491 1,2354 1,0498 4,5939 0,1577 0,2001 
 Skewness 0,5097 2,0666 0,7836 3,4269 -0,1898 0,3687 20,4108 -2,0088 0,8596 -0,9815 0,3791 0,7319 -0,8543 0,7718 -0,5841 
 Kurtosis 4,6944 9,0332 3,7407 13,7655 3,1258 8,9756 418,3636 9,4201 3,6688 3,2710 1,9859 2,8987 2,7493 3,1348 1,6193 
 Jarque-Bera 68,75 940,38 52,83 2,86E+03 2,81 637,42 3,06E+06 14,65 59,84 69,04 28,19 37,85 52,44 42,22 57,51 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,2452 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 Sum 143,86 23,93 72,96 -85,07 7,15E+03 44,39 1,81E+04 41,97 13,16 802,36 532,90 740,00 3,44E+04 557,32 559,47 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 15,74 1,61 6,74 6,80E+03 643,68 3,98 2,69E+08 9,79E+04 0,1565 3,91E+03 642,5859 463,99 8,88E+03 10,48 16,85 
 Observations 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 
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Panel 3: Descriptive Statistics for firms in the U.S.A. 
  
TOTAL 
DEBT 
RATIO 
SHORT 
DEBT 
RATIO 
LONG 
DEBT 
RATIO 
TANG F_SIZE PROF DIV GROW NONTAX GDP INFL INTR EXCH DEPO LOAN 
 Mean 0,4056 0,2401 0,0411 -1,0398 16,4197 0,4749 0,3783 1,9067 0,0305 1,6599 2,3393 4,6195 77,0030 0,6910 0,4181 
 Median 0,3851 0,2220 0,0237 -0,9500 16,4684 0,4108 0,2649 0,7770 0,0279 2,2500 2,6700 3,2500 75,3200 0,7744 0,4031 
 Maximum 1,4904 0,7440 0,6567 14,8761 19,5006 4,2986 140,7273 2,3690 0,1046 3,8000 3,8100 8,2500 85,5100 0,9459 0,4864 
 Minimum -0,1859 0,0000 0,0000 -17,7342 12,5574 -0,4121 -215,2889 -6,0404 0,0033 -2,8000 -2,8000 -0,3200 70,8700 0,0639 0,3717 
 Std. Dev. 0,2063 0,1336 0,0574 1,9589 1,0801 0,3860 6,9955 6,3512 0,0153 1,8773 1,2727 2,0041 4,3389 0,2399 0,0367 
 Skewness 0,6398 0,6283 3,4593 -0,4340 -0,1104 2,0487 -14,0113 3,3216 0,8365 -1,3094 -1,3443 0,6077 0,7873 -1,6724 0,6515 
 Kurtosis 4,1794 3,2937 22,8367 60,0969 3,0624 14,1941 699,7697 12,6666 3,7359 3,7866 4,7675 2,1271 2,5878 5,0566 2,0429 
 Jarque-Bera 193,32 106,29 2,82E+04 2,08E+05 3,36 9,07E+03 3,10E+07 1,02E+08 213,24 4,77E+02 660,86 142,94 169,11 984,13 166,86 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,1863 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 Sum 621,33 367,80 63,01 -1,59E+03 2,52E+04 727,61 579,50 2,92E+03 46,77 2,54E+03 3,58E+03 7,08E+03 1,18E+05 1,06E+03 640,54 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 65,18 27,33 5,04 5,88E+03 1,79E+03 228,08 7,49E+04 6,18E+06 0,36 5,40E+03 2,48E+03 6,15E+03 2,88E+04 88,1254 2,06 
 Observations 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532 
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Table 3.  Correlation Matrix 
Correlation 
Probability 
Total Debt 
Ratio  
Long-term 
Debt Ratio  
Short-term 
Debt Ratio TANG F_SIZE PROF  DIV  GROW  NONTAX  GDP  INFL  INTR  EXCH  DEPO  LOAN  
Total Debt Ratio  1,0000                             
-----                              
Long-term Debt 
Ratio  
0,5436 1,0000                           
0,0000 -----                            
Short-term Debt 
Ratio 
0,0859 0,0099 1,0000                         
0,0001 0,6610 -----                          
TANG 0,0863 0,0635 0,0105 1,0000                       
  0,0001 0,0050 0,6443 -----                        
F_SIZE  0,1599 -0,0024 0,1228 -0,0707 1,0000                     
  0,0000 0,9154 0,0000 0,0018 -----                      
PROF  0,0434 0,1827 -0,0674 -0,0377 -0,3703 1,0000                   
  0,0552 0,0000 0,0029 0,0961 0,0000 -----                    
DIV  0,0306 0,0308 0,0000 0,0060 -0,0091 -0,0267 1,0000                 
  0,1757 0,1740 0,9999 0,7897 0,6878 0,2390 -----                  
GROW  -0,0067 0,0035 -0,0026 -0,0055 -0,0175 0,0134 -0,0002 1,0000               
  0,7671 0,8785 0,9073 0,8073 0,4402 0,5547 0,9927 -----                
NONTAX  0,0819 0,0036 0,0719 0,1686 0,0297 0,0036 0,0022 -0,0095 1,0000             
  0,0003 0,8734 0,0015 0,0000 0,1901 0,8741 0,9228 0,6755 -----              
GDP  -0,0667 -0,0679 0,0103 0,0115 -0,0385 0,0054 -0,0231 -0,0472 0,0029 1,0000           
  0,0032 0,0027 0,6479 0,6101 0,0891 0,8115 0,3081 0,0369 0,8991 -----            
INFL  0,0393 0,0526 -0,0109 -0,0414 -0,0840 0,1513 0,0209 -0,0352 -0,0103 0,4265 1,0000         
  0,0826 0,0200 0,6289 0,0670 0,0002 0,0000 0,3559 0,1200 0,6500 0,0000 -----          
INTR  0,0100 0,0705 -0,0115 -0,0627 -0,1664 0,2089 -0,0220 -0,0126 0,0242 0,3122 0,5690 1,0000       
  0,6600 0,0018 0,6102 0,0056 0,0000 0,0000 0,3314 0,5775 0,2856 0,0000 0,0000 -----        
EXCH  -0,1101 -0,0942 0,0390 0,0627 -0,0229 -0,1853 -0,0264 -0,0040 0,0604 0,3815 -0,1373 0,0444 1,0000     
  0,0000 0,0000 0,0847 0,0056 0,3109 0,0000 0,2429 0,8603 0,0076 0,0000 0,0000 0,0500 -----      
DEPO  -0,0554 -0,0603 0,0277 0,0909 0,2103 -0,3004 0,0574 0,0028 -0,0239 -0,1577 -0,3784 -0,6570 0,1485 1,0000   
  0,0144 0,0077 0,2214 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0111 0,9006 0,2902 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -----    
LOAN  -0,1132 -0,1127 0,0543 0,1257 0,1971 -0,3914 0,0545 -0,0100 0,0058 -0,0869 -0,3058 -0,5432 0,3410 0,6491 1,0000 
  0,0000 0,0000 0,0163 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0159 0,6602 0,7993 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -----  
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Table 4. Heterogeneity Test 
 
 
Panel 1   Panel 2   Panel 3 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
Equation: EQ_Total debt/total assets    Equation: EQ_Long-term debt ratio   Equation: EQ_Short-term debt ratio   
                                
 Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.    Effects Test   Statistic   d.f.  Prob.    Effects Test   Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Period F 0,8569 -91925,0 0,5636   Period F 0,5465 -91925,0 0,8411   Period F 1,2627 -91919,0 0,2524 
Period Chi-
square 7,8363 9,0000 0,5507   
Period Chi-
square 5,0014 9,0000 0,8342   
Period Chi-
square 11,5370 9,0000 0,2407 
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Table 5. Regression Results for Total Debt Ratio, Long-Term Debt Ratio and Short-Term Debt Ratio, Considering All Variables 
Panel 1, 2 and 3 report the regression results for total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio when controlling all explanatory 
variables. Sample period includes 10 years from 2004 to 2013. 
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Table 6. Regression Results for Total Debt Ratio, Long-Term Debt Ratio and Short-Term Debt Ratio Controlling Firm Specific Variables, 
Country Dummy and Industry Dummy 
Panel 1, 2 and 3 report the regression results for total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio when controlling only firms 
specific variables, country dummy and industry dummy variables. Sample period extends 10 years from 2004 to 2013. 
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Table 7. Regression Results for Long-Term Debt Ratio Controlling Firm Specific Variables, Country and Industry Dummy Variables, and Each 
Macroeconomic Variable Individually 
Panel 1-6 report the regression results for long-term debt ratio when controlling firms specific variables, country and industry dummy variables, 
and each macroeconomic variables individually. Sample period extends 10 years from 2004 to 2013.  
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Table 8. Regression results for short-term debt ratio controlling firm specific variable, country and industry dummy variables, and each 
macroeconomic variable  
Panel 1-6 report the regression results for short-term debt ratio when controlling firms specific variables, country and industry dummy 
variables, and each macroeconomic variable individually. Sample period extends 10 years from 2004 to 2013. 
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Appendix B 
Figure 1. Pooled Regression Residual Plot for Total Debt Ratio 
 
Table 2. Pooled Regression Residual Plot for Long-Term Debt Ratio  
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Table 3. Pooled Regression Residual Plot for Short-Term Debt Ratio  
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